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This dissertation investigates the effects of mergers and acquisitions and 
spin-offs on the firm and its debtholders. This paper analyzes changes in the firm 
characteristics including capital structure, business risks, and operating 
performance. I develop a theoretical model that predicts the relationship between 
cross-sectional firm characteristics and the changes in wealth of the original 
bondholders (of the parent/acquirer firms) that have publicly traded outstanding 
nonconvertible debt at the time of a spin-off and merger/acquisition respectively. 
The empirical analysis shows wealth effects on the original bondholders of the 
parent/acquirer firm. Monthly bond returns are calculated relative to the 
announcement date for a sample of firms that have undertaken a spin-off or 
 vii 
merger/acquisition. The results show a cross-sectional variation in the reaction to 
the announcement. The cross-sectional firm characteristics that determine the 
magnitude of these effects are identified. A parent firm’s pre-spin-off leverage, 
change in leverage, and change in operating efficiency as a result of the spin-off 
are important determinants of wealth distribution to bondholders in these 
corporate restructurings. The results of this study provide evidence that different 
value drivers, depending on the type of restructuring, determine bondholder 
wealth effects. In spin-offs, the leverage effect is the predominant determinant of 
bondholder wealth. In mergers and acquisitions, the change in business risks 
primarily influences the effect of the merger on bondholder wealth. Bondholders 
gain more in focus-increasing spin-offs and in focus-preserving 
(nonconglomerate) mergers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Any restructuring of a firm affects not only shareholders, but also other 
stakeholders. Classic microeconomic theory presumes that firms act solely to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth or firm net present value. Yet, Jensen-Meckling’s 
(1976) exploration of the agency relationships of corporate organization suggests 
that incentive conflicts can motivate maximization of stockholder wealth or 
management wealth at the expense of firm value maximization.  In a similar vein, 
Bulow and Shoven (1978) analyze situations where management is induced to 
maximize wealth of debtholders. Thus, the existence of incentive conflicts 
provides a variety of motivations for corporate restructuring. 
This study tests the prediction of many of the currently held theories by 
analyzing the effects that corporate restructurings have on the firm’s 
characteris tics and thereby on the market prices of the firms’ outstanding publicly 
traded nonconvertible debt. The focus in the study is on two types of 
restructurings including mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs. 
Recent research investigates the wealth effects on investors by exclusively 
considering either mergers and acquisitions or spin-offs, but not both. 1 This study 
analyzes the effects of each type of restructuring and compares the results across 
both.  It examines whether announcement returns are particular to spin-offs or 
whether they accompany other restructuring events that involve a change in the 
form of outstanding securities. From an operational perspective a merger is the 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 on literature review for a detailed discussion of the studies on spin-offs and 
merger and acquisitions that study wealth effects. 
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opposite of a spin-off; in the former case two companies become one, and in the 
latter case one company becomes two. Yet, from a debtholder perspective, both 
types of restructurings share an important similarity in that both involve a change 
in the business units of the acquirer/parent firm. This change can further be 
accompanied by a change in the capital structure, business risks, and/or 
operational efficiencies of the acquirer/parent firm. A merger/acquisition may be 
viewed as an exchange of riskless assets for risky physical assets and a divestiture 
as just the reverse. 
An interesting question is whether the announcement returns are unique to 
a particular type of restructuring or whether they accompany other restructuring 
events that also involve a change in the form of outstanding securities. In a stock-
for-stock merger, for example, the bidder company issues its own stock in 
exchange for the target company’s stock, which ceases to exist. In contrast, in a 
spin-off a new public entity is created.  
The conflict of interest between a firm's bondholders and its stockholders 
is discussed by a number of authors. Black (1976) points out “there is no easier 
way for a company to escape the burden of a debt than to pay out all of its assets 
in the form of a dividend, and leave the creditors holding an empty shell”. A spin-
off is a mode of corporate restructuring in which a part of the assets of a company 
are spun-off and the subsidiary shares are distributed to parent shareholders. The 
bondholders of the parent firm cannot claim any assets of the new firm and lose a 
part of the collateral underlying their claims. Schipper and Smith (1983), Hite and 
Owers (1983), Parrino (1997), Dittmar (2000) analyze the effects of spin-offs on 
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the existing bondholders of the parent firm. This study investigates the wealth 
effects of both spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions on the existing holders of 
the outstanding publicly traded nonconvertible bonds of the parent/acquirer firm. 
Although spin-offs have a potential to shift wealth from debt to equity 
holders, the effects of a spin-off on the organizational structure of the firm is far 
more than a simple division of assets. Spin-offs affect a number of the 
characteristics of the parent firm. For example, management's ability to finance a 
firm’s assets could improve because of the spin-off’s resultant reorganization. A 
subsidiary with higher business risks would limit the ability of the parent to raise 
cheap capital. Investors can demand a higher risk premium because of the higher 
risk of the combined firm. By spinning off the subsidiary, a parent could ensure 
that its capital costs are kept in control. The spin-off could be structured so that 
post-spin-off the parent is left with a lower debt to equity ratio or a higher interest 
coverage ratio. A spin-off could also change the operational efficiency of the firm 
by removing negative synergies between the parent and the subsidiary or by 
realigning managerial motivation. 
Different firm-level effects of the spin-off could affect the wealth 
distribution to bondholders. This dissertation predicts a theoretical model and 
explores the relationship between cross-sectional firm characteristics and the 
wealth effects of the spin-off on bondholders. 
With respect to mergers and acquisitions, although financial theorists have 
examined corporate mergers from many different perspectives, most models 
predict one of two primary effects: (1) Either mergers create net new wealth from 
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operating or financial synergies or (2) they redistribute existing wealth between 
stakeholder classes. Although empirical support exists for both these effects, it is 
challenging to examine wealth creation and wealth transfers in a single analysis. 
This study extends the existing theoretical models to allow for an analysis of the 
two predicted effects of corporate restructurings on debtholders in a single 
framework by building a model of the relationship between changes in firm 
characteristics and their expected effect on the wealth of existing debtholders of 
the acquiring firm. 
The empirical analyses show bondholder wealth effects of both mergers 
and acquisitions and spin-offs. The use of  a comprehensive corporate bond data 
set that supplies trader-quotes around the corporate restructuring event allows 
improvement on the  poor quality of bond data. Such an improvement affects the 
results of many prior studies on bondho lder wealth.  Trader quotes for bond prices, 
returns, and ratings data is collected for the outstanding publicly traded 
nonconvertible bonds of the firms in the spin-off and mergers and acquisition 
sample. The use of trader quotes provides bond prices around the restructuring 
event that better reflect the response of investors in the bond markets to the 
changes in the parent/acquirer firm. It is therefore possible to analyze the wealth 
effects of corporate restructuring events on debtholders by using a more extensive  
sample of nonconvertible bonds and parent/acquirer pairs. 
Changes that occur in the parent /acquirer firm structure as a result of the 
spin-off/merger and acquisition are also investigated. The empirical chapters of 
this dissertation test whether excess bond returns are related systematically to any 
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underlying variables that characterize the parent/acquirer firm. The cross-
sectional firm characteristics that determine the magnitude of bondholder wealth 
effects are identified and the sensitivities of the wealth effects to the firm-level 
characteristics are measured. 
This study finds evidence of reactions in the bond markets to both types of 
restructurings. The average reaction of the holders of the outstanding 
nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm to the spin-off announcement is 
significantly negative  in the month of the announcement. For the sample of 
matched-acquirer firms, although the bondholder reaction is insignificant in the 
announcement month, a significant negative reaction is observed from three 
months before to two months after the merger announcement. There also exists a 
cross-sectional variation in the reaction to the announcement. Forty-one percent 
(37%) of the parent spin-off firms (bonds) have a positive response to the spin-off 
announcement, while 59% (63%) of the parent spin-off firms (bonds) exhibit a 
negative return. Similarly for the matched merger sample, 47% (49%) of all 
acquirer firms (bonds) exhibit a positive reaction, while 53% (51%) of the 
acquirer firms (bonds) exhibit a negative reaction. 
The restructurings affect both parent and acquirer firm characteristics. 
There is a significant change in total debt, size and leverage. For spin-offs, the 
parent firms’ size, total debt, and leverage significantly decrease, while in mergers 
and acquisitions, the acquirer firm’s size, total debt, and leverage exhibit a 
significant increase. Operating performance, as measured by the industry-adjusted 
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ROA, of the matched-acquirer firms has a significant decrease in the year 
following the merger announcement. 
Pre-spin-off leverage, change in leverage, and change in the operating 
efficiency of the parent firm as a result of the spin-off are important determinants 
of the distribution of wealth to bondholders in spin-offs. While in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions, change in variance and change in operating efficiency 
of both acquirer and the target firms affect bondholder returns. The bondholder 
wealth effects are driven by the change in the business risks of the acquirer rather 
than by changes in leverage of the acquirer. 
With respect to mergers and acquisitions, a focus- increasing or a focus-
preserving merger (i.e., a nonconglomerate merger) exhibits a greater 
improvement in operating performance of the acquirer firm. The implication is 
that holders of outstanding bonds could expect higher gains in a nonconglomerate 
merger than in a conglomerate merger. The significant positive coefficient on the 
change in the target firms’ industry-adjusted ROA implies that existing 
bondholders of acquirer firms share in the merger’s resultant synergy that leads to 
better overall operating performance. 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior 
empirical and theoretical research on spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions and  
discusses the implications of the existing theoretical models. Chapter 3 discusses 
the potential effects on bondholders’ wealth of spin-offs and mergers and 
acquisitions. I also develop the parameters of a comprehensive model to study 
both negative as well as positive effects on bondholders’ wealth. The relationship 
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between the firm-level changes and the expected changes in the wealth of existing 
debtholders of the parent/acquirer firm is examined through the framework of a 
model. This theoretical model is empirically tested in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 describes the spin-off and mergers and acquisition data sample as well 
as the bond returns data set. Chapter 5 presents results surrounding the 
announcement period for the spin-off sample as well as for the matched-acquirer 
firm’s sample. Chapter 6 documents the effects of the restructuring on the parent  
and acquirer firms.  Chapter 7 tests the predictions of the theoretical model for the 
changes in parent/acquirer firm characteristics that could influence the wealth 
effects of spin-offs on bondholders.  I test the relationships between changes in 
parent/acquirer firm characteristics and wealth effects of the parent/acquirer firm 
bondholders and the wealth.  The results from the analyses on the spin-off sample 
and the merger and acquisition datasets are then compared. Chapter 8 summarizes 
the findings and the implications of this study.  
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 Chapter 2: Review of previous research on corporate 
restructurings 
 
2.1. MOTIVATION FOR SPIN-OFFS  
A spin-off does not alter the composition of assets supporting the original 
shareholder claims. A spin-off, however, does alter contracts among stockholders, 
creditors, managers, and regulators. The motivation behind a spin-off could 
influence the effects of the spin-off on the different parties that contract with the 
firm. A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain the increases in 
shareholder wealth that accompany spin-offs. One set of hypotheses argues that 
potential shareholder wealth gains in spin-offs are due to expropriation of 
bondholder wealth. Other hypotheses argue that spin-offs gains are attributable to 
the relaxation of regulatory or tax constraints, facilitation of mergers, correction 
of previous managerial mistakes, or better management focus after the spin-off. 
H1. Expropriation effects hypothesis.  Spin-offs result in a transfer of wealth from 
bondholders to stockholders resulting from the transfer of wealth to captive 
finance subsidiaries. Hite and Owers (1983) study bond price reactions around 
spin-off announcements and do not find the expected negative reaction of bond 
prices to support this hypothesis. Schipper and Smith (1983) also find no evidence 
of wealth transfer from their study of bond ratings and bond prices around spin-
off announcements. Parrino (1997), however, finds a significant decline in the 
value of Marriott’s bonds following its spin-off announcement. He concludes that 
the initial wealth transfer to Marriott's shareholders was largely dissipated in 
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litigation and other transaction costs. Maxwell and Rao (2002) also find evidence 
that the value gain to stockholders is negatively related to the value loss to 
bondholders. However, even accounting for the bondholders’ loss, the aggregate 
value of the publicly traded debt and equity increases on a spin-off 
announcement, suggesting that the wealth transfer hypothesis can only partially 
explain stockholder gains in spin-offs. 
H2. Gains from relaxation of regulatory or tax constraints hypothesis. Schipper 
and Smith (1983) find some evidence in support of this hypothesis, particularly 
for a subsample of firms. But they observe this to be a partial explanation. Hite 
and Owers (1983) find negative cumulative abnormal returns for the group of 
firms that mention legal/regulatory difficulties as the reason for the spin-off. 
H3. Mergers facilitation. Spin-offs provide a method of transferring control of 
corporate assets to bidders. Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) find that post-
spin-off nearly 15% of both parents and subsidiaries become takeover targets. 
They propose that takeover activity leads to the positive abnormal returns for up  
to three years beyond the spin-off announcement date. In such a case, the spin-off 
could decrease the asset base underlying bondholders’ claims. 
H4. Clientele hypothesis. Vijh (1994) documents ex-date excess returns of 3% for 
spin-offs, along with increased trading volume, excess volatility, and higher bid-
ask spreads. He suggests that the higher volume on the ex-date, inspite of a 3% 
price discount before ex-date, indicates a clientele effect. The parent and 
subsidiary stock can be followed by different analysts and attract different 
investors. A spin-off announcement tells the market that the two businesses will 
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separate and that a package of stocks will be unbundled. Vijh argues that the 
imminent unbundling makes it attractive for potential buyers to wait until the ex-
date. Although, he argues potential sellers should act before the ex-date. He 
therefore attributes spin-off ex-date returns to market imperfections that result in 
many investors being interested in one (but not both) of the post-divestiture 
shares. 
H5. Correction-of-a-mistake hypothesis. Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed 
(1995) propose that spin-offs represent the undoing of an unwise takeover. They 
find that spin-offs that began as acquisitions have excess returns negatively 
correlated with original acquisition announcement excess returns. However they 
do not find evidence to support the hypothesis that excess returns for spin-offs 
that began as acquisitions is larger than those for spin-offs that were not 
acquisitions. 
H6. Refocusing the firm hypothesis. Schipper and Smith (1983) suggest that spin-
off gains might result from the decrease in the number and diversity of 
transactions under one management. However, they have no rigorous test for this 
hypothesis. Hite and Owers (1983) show some support based on the positive 
excess returns for the group of firms that state specialization as the reason for the 
spin-off.  Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) find support for the hypothesis 
that cross-industry spin-off distributions, where the continuing and spun-off units 
belong to different two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes create 
more value than own-industry spin-offs, through improved operating 
performance. 
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H7. "Information content" hypothesis. Nanda and Narayanan (1997) formally 
develop the information related argument for divestitures through a model of 
asymmetric information about firm value between the managers of the firm and 
the market. They assume that the market can observe the aggregate cash flows of 
the firm but not the individual divisional cash flows. This results in misevaluation 
of the firm’s securities. If a firm requires external capital to finance growth 
opportunities, then an undervalued firm will resort to raising capital either through 
a divestiture or after a divestiture, and an overvalued firm will resort to an equity 
issue without separating its divisions. The implication in the context of spin-offs 
is, that since the divestiture does not generate cash inflows to the firm, 
undervalued firms requiring capital would first engage in a spin-off to attain fair 
market value for their shares and then issue equity to raise capital. 
 
2.2.  MOTIVATIONS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
A review of financial literature suggests the following major motives for 
mergers and acquisitions: the synergy motive, the agency motive, and the hubris 
hypothesis. The synergy motive suggests that mergers occur because of economic 
gains that result by merging the resources of the two firms. The agency motive 
suggests that mergers occur because they enhance the acquirer management’s 
welfare at the expense of the acquiring firm’s shareholders. The hubris hypothesis 
suggests that managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms and engage in 
acquisitions even when there is no synergy. 
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Synergy motive. The synergy motive proposes that managers of target and 
acquirer firms maximize shareholder wealth and would engage in merger activity 
only if it results in gains to both sets of shareholders. In a synergistic acquisition 
the value of the combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the 
individual firms (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988). The additional value, or 
synergistic gain, is derived from an increase in operational efficiency, an increase 
in market power, or some form of financial gain. Operational synergies can be 
driven by economies of scale. The theory of operational synergies as a motive for 
mergers is based on a number of major assumptions. It first assumes that 
economies of scale do exist in the industries of the merging firms. Second, the 
theory postulates that prior to the merger involved firms operate at levels of 
activity that fall short of achieving the potential for economies of scale. Basically, 
economies of scale involve “indivisibilities” (such as people, equipment, and 
overhead), which provide increasing returns if spread over a large number of units 
of output. Financial synergy encompasses the potential for achieving a lower cost 
of capital as a result of the reduced risk of bankruptcy when imperfectly 
correlated cash flow streams are joined.  
Agency Motive. Some theorists suggest that acquisitions can be primarily 
motivated by the self- interests of the acquiring managers. Several reasons explain 
this motive. Among them are diversification of management’s personal portfolio 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981), use of free cash flow to increase the size of the firm 
(Jensen, 1986), and acquiring assets that increase the firm’s dependence on the 
management (Shliefer and Vishny, 1990). The basic idea in all of these 
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explanations is that acquisitions result in the extraction of value from the 
acquiring firm stakeholders by acquirer management. For example, “ specialist” 
managements acquire firms in their own lines of business so that the success of 
the combined entity will depend even more on their specific skills.  The 
management can exploit this dependency to increase perquisite consumption or 
defeat rivals who are better than itself in running some of the operations of the 
firm. Such management actions result in agency costs that reduce the total value 
of the combined firm available to the stakeholders. 
Hubris hypothesis. The hubris hypothesis maintains that acquisitions are 
motivated by managers’ mistakes and that there are no synergy gains (Roll, 1986). 
It assumes that the valuation of the target is a random variable whose mean is the 
current market price and that takeover premiums merely reflect a random error. 
Roll argues that although acquirer managers can make errors of overvaluation or 
undervaluation, the observed error is typically in the same direction. The left tail 
of the distribution of valuations is truncated by the current market price. The 
hubris hypothesis predicts that the entire premium paid to the target firm is a 
transfer from the acquirer. 
 
2.3.  PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
2.3.1.  Spin-offs and shareholders  
A number of studies show the effects of spin-off announcements on 
shareholder wealth. Hite and Owers (1983) report an event-period excess return of 
3.30% surrounding first announcements and 7.00% over an extended period 
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beginning fifty days before the first announcement and ending on the completion 
date when the spin-off becomes certain. Schipper and Smith (1983) show a two-
day excess return of 2.84% and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) report 3.34%.  
Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) report that both spin-offs and their parents 
offer significantly positive abnormal returns for up to three years beyond the spin-
off announcement date, even after adjusting for takeover premiums. 
2.3.2.  Spin-offs and bondholders  
Most studies examine the issue of corporate restructuring through spin-
offs under the assumption that the firm is one homogeneous unit whose clear 
objective is to maximize its market. With a few exceptions, prior studies focus on 
the effects of spin-offs only on stockholders. However, in a growing body of 
literature (Black, 1976; Fama, 1978; Fama-Miller, 1972; Galai-Masulius, 1976; 
Jensen-Meckling, 1976; Kalay, 1982; Myers, 1977; Smith-Warner, 1979), 
researchers recognize that the firm is a collection of groups whose interests can, 
and do, conflict. Of the groups comprising the firm, the largest and perhaps the 
most important two are the bondholders and the stockholders. The effect of spin-
offs on the wealth of bondholders is an interesting issue in its own right and must 
be addressed to determine the effect of spin-offs on total firm value. Bondholders 
represent one of the most important primary stakeholder groups. Relatively few 
prior studies look at the impact of spin-offs on the outstanding bonds of the firm. 
Schipper and Smith (1983) study bond price and rating behavior around 
spin-off announcements. Of their sample of 93 firms that had spin-offs during the 
period 1963 to 1981, the bond price (rating) data is very limited. The bond prices 
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are obtained from the Wall Street Journal for 16 nonconvertible bonds for four 
firms that had voluntarily announced spin-offs. For eight of the sample 
nonconvertible bonds, there is evidence of a decline in bond value at the spin-off 
announcement. Bond ratings are obtained for 19 bonds (including both 
convertible and nonconvertible bonds) for 16 firms. Schipper and Smith report 
that only two bonds (of the same firm) experience a decline in bond rating the 
year after the spin-off announcement. They interpret the low sample frequency of 
declines in bond prices and ratings associated with spin-off announcements as not 
suggestive of a widespread reduction in bondholder collateral. 
Hite and Owers (1983) further study the bondholder wealth effects of 
spin-off announcements by examining returns around the spin-off announcement 
date for senior securities (including preferred stocks). These senior securities 
include both the convertible and nonconvertible bonds and preferred shares. Of 
their total sample of 123 spin-offs during 1963 to 1981, they find only 31 firms 
with a total of 53 publicly traded issues at the time of the spin-off announcement. 
These issues consist of 15 straight bonds, 17 convertible bonds, five straight 
preferred stocks, and 16 convertible preferred stocks. The authors encounter the 
problem of infrequent trading activity in these issues as the senior security price 
data is collected from the Wall Street Journal and from Compuserve Inc. Hite and 
Owers handle the infrequent trading problem by smoothing the returns, i.e., over 
any interval. If the security trades on day t-n and next day t, they treat the return 
not as a single observation but an n-day return such that an unbiased estimate of 
the return on day t is simply the n-day return divided by n.  They compute mean 
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cumulative prediction errors during the event period from day –10 to day +10. If 
the security trades on day t-n and next on day t, they compute a prediction error 
only for day t as follows:   
 
( )
~
mnnRPE jtjt -= .              (1) 
 
where
~
m  is the estimate of the mean from the estimation period of 40 days from 
day  – 50 to day – 11. On the day of the announcement, they find the mean 
cumulative errors are not significantly different from zero. They conclude that if 
senior security prices react instantaneously to the release of information, then they 
do not find evidence to support H1, the expropriation hypothesis, which states that 
gains to the stockholders occur at the expense of senior security-holders. 
In contrast, Parrino (1997) shows a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders and a decline in the total value of the firm following the spin-off 
announcement by Marriott in October 1992. Unlike the previous studies, which 
examine the relatively few debt issues that are traded on the New York Exchange, 
Parrino uses dealer bid prices to determine changes in the value of Marriott’s 13 
senior note and debenture issues that were outstanding at the time of the spin-off 
announcement.  The dealer bid price data reveal that the prices of all of Marriott’s 
fixed- income securities declined during the three days following the spin-off 
announcement. The aggregate market-adjusted value of the 13 senior notes and 
debentures fell 16.51% ($333.3 million), suggesting there was a wealth transfer to 
the shareholders. The magnitude of the bondholder and preferred shareholder loss 
exceeded the common shareholder gains. Parrino suggests that all of the 
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shareholder gains resulted from a wealth transfer. One reason for the decline in 
the value of Marriott's debt was the low coverage ratio of the parent after the spin-
off. Moreover the spin-off also increased the average variability of the parent’s 
cash flows by distributing the businesses with the most stable cash flows to the 
spun-off entity, and thereby increasing the riskiness of the cash flows underlying 
the bondholder claims. 
More recently, Maxwell and Rao (2002) test the wealth expropria tion 
hypothesis (H1) that stockholder gains on the announcement of a spin-off are due 
to a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. They find evidence 
consistent with wealth expropriation. Using the Lehman Brothers Bond Database 
for bond data, which they consider to have more accurate bond price data than 
exchange traded price data, they examine the stock and bond returns for a sample 
of 80 firms that announced a spin-off between 1976 and 1997.2 Bondholders of 
the firms in their spin-off sample, on average, suffer a statistically significant 
negative abnormal return of 0.88% during the month of the spin-off 
announcement, while stockholders on average gain a statistically significant 3.6%. 
They interpret these results to suggest that spin-offs on average may expropriate 
wealth from bondholders, but it is only a partial explanation of the gains to 
stockholders. They also test for factors that influence relative wealth changes for 
bond and stockholders. They find that bondholder losses (stockholder gains) are 
significantly influenced by loss of collateral and by financial risk. Loss of 
                                                 
2 The Lehman Brothers Bond Database is the same database as the Fixed Income Database used in 
this dissertation. Maxwell and Rao (2002) use a sample of spin-offs announced between 1976 and 
1997. I use a sample of spin-offs announced and also completed between 1979 and April 30, 1998. 
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collateral is measured by size of the assets in the spin-off entity relative to the pre-
spin-off firm. The degree of financial risk is measured by high pre-spin-off 
leverage ratios of debt-to-equity and debt-to-market value of equity, and 
alternatively by low pre-spin-off bond ratings (non- investment grade). They find 
the negative relation between the leverage ratios and abnormal bond returns 
consistent with the idea that the increased gains to stockholders of firms with 
greater leverage is due to the higher degree of wealth transfer from bondholders. 
They do not find any difference in the returns to bondholders based on whether 
the spin-off is cross-industry versus same-industry. Therefore they do not support 
the hypothesis that the loss of coinsurance effect to bondholders in a cross-
industry spin-off could yield potentially higher wealth transfer effects to 
shareholders compared to same-industry spin-offs. 
2.3.3. Mergers and acquisitions and bondholders 
Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions indicate that bondholders 
generally earn normal or positive abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement date. The studies of Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim 
(1982), and Dennis and McConnell (1986) use an event study methodology and 
find that bondholders neither gain nor lose following mergers. The first two 
studies examine conglomerate mergers; Dennis and McConnell (1986) examine 
conglomerate and nonconglomerate mergers. Bondholders earn normal return 
regardless of bond rating or issuer status (i.e., acquiring or target firm). The 
authors conclude that managers often neutralize wealth transfers to bondholders 
by increasing firm leverage, but they do not test this hypothesis directly. Asquith 
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and Kim (1982) and Dennis and McConnell (1986) test whether bond returns are 
related negatively to the issuer’s stock return (evidence of incentive effects) or the 
correlation between the stock returns of the two merging firms (evidence of the 
coinsurance effect). Neither variable is found to be statistically significant. 
Sweeney (1991) examines the sequence of events implied by the increased 
debt capacity hypothesis as a motive for conglomerate merger. His hypotheses are 
that the merger should  
· Decrease the earnings variability of the acquiring firm; 
· Increase the firm’s leverage ratio; and 
· Not reduce shareholder wealth. 
He finds that only eight of the 23 conglomerate mergers he examines meet all of 
these conditions, a proportion too low to support the increased debt capacity 
hypothesis. 
Settle, Petry, and Hsia (1984) examine conglomerate as well as 
nonconglomerate mergers. They find that bondholders gain when the combined 
pre-merger debt ratio (defined as the sum of the long-term debt of both merging 
parties divided by the sum of their total assets) of the merging firms is greater 
than 20%. Bondholders earn normal returns when this ratio is less than 20%. They 
do not test the impact of leverage changes on bondholder wealth for individual 
firms. 
Eger (1983) finds that bondholders earn positive abnormal returns 
following pure stock exchange mergers. Her hypothesis is that bondholders gain 
because pure stock exchange mergers are associated with lower incentive effects 
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than mergers that involve cash or new debt securities. In contrast Travlos (1987) 
finds that the nonconvertible bondholders of acquiring firms earn normal returns 
following cash offers and negative abnormal returns following stock exchanges. 
He argues that these results are consistent with the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
signaling hypothesis. 
Rathinasamy, Philippatos, and Shrieves (1991) use the pre-merger debt 
ratios, the cash flow variances and the cash flow correlations of the merging firms 
to estimate the potential debt capacity of merging pairs. They find that 
bondholders earn normal returns when actual debt levels are greater than potential 
debt capacity, and bondholders earn positive abnormal returns when actual debt 
levels are below potential. 
Walker (1994) reports a significant amount of variation in bond returns 
(following corporate takeovers) than do the conclusions drawn from previous 
studies. He finds that though nonconvertible bondholders do not gain or lose in 
the aggregate, bond returns are related inversely to issuer default risk. Low quality 
bonds (rated BBB or below) tend to gain from takeovers, and high quality bonds 
(rated A or above) tend to lose. He also finds some evidence that bondholders 
earn larger excess returns when mergers increase the firm’s leverage ratio. He 
interprets this result as being more consistent with the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
signaling hypothesis. 
With the exception of Walker (1994), almost all of the studies previously 
cited use an event study methodology. Most studies also analyze the various 
subsamples using an event study methodology. For example, Settle, Petry and 
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Hsia (1984) differentiate between low debt and high debt merging pairs, 
Rathinasamy, Philippatos, and Shrieves (1991) divide their sample by potential 
debt capacity, and Travlos (1987) and Eger (1983) group bondholders by payment 
method (cash or stock). These subsamples, however, represent only indirect tests 
of incentive effects. 
 
2.4. THEORETICAL MODELS OF WEALTH TRANSFERS IN CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 
Black and Scholes (1973) were among the first to suggest that the equity 
in a levered firm can be thought of as a call option. When shareholders issue 
bonds, it is equivalent to selling the assets of the firm to the bondholders in return 
for cash (the proceeds of the bond issues) and a call option. The bondholders have 
claims to the assets but not control over the assets. If shareholders unexpectedly 
reduce the asset base of the company, then the bondholders have less collateral. 
For example, in a restructuring through a spin-off, a portion of the parent firm’s 
assets is spun-off into a new public entity. Depending on the division of debt 
between the parent and the subsidiary, the original bondholders of the parent firm 
might not have any claims to the assets of the subsid iary, thereby resulting in a 
dilution of their claims. Another way shareholders change bondholders’ claims is 
by increasing the book value debt-to-equity ratio while restructuring the business 
units of the firm. This maybe done by issuing additional debt and using the 
proceeds to the benefit of the shareholders. If the new debt has equal claims on 
those assets, then the original bondholders end up with a partial to the assets of 
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the firm, whereas before the new debt was issued, they had complete claims on 
the assets. This puts the original bondholders in a riskier position as they are 
unable to charge more for the extra risk because the discounted value of their 
bonds has already been paid. Consequently, the market value of the bonds of the 
original bondholders will fall. At the same time, the market value of the firm’s 
stock increases as a consequence of the restructuring. Thus a portion of the 
shareholder’s wealth increase can be attributed to the loss in wealth of the original 
bondholders. This is called the wealth transfer hypothesis.  The theory of option 
pricing argues that in a world with no transaction costs or taxes, the wealth of 
shareholders is increased by greater financial leverage.    
2.4.1. The combined Option Pricing Model and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
applied to pricing of securities in spin-offs 
Galai and Masulis (1976) present a theoretical model of corporate security 
pricing that combines the Option Pricing Model (OPM) with the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). This theoretical model is constructed as follows. 
Consider a firm with one pure-discount bond issue and one common stock 
issue. The bond with the face value C will mature at T (i.e., T periods from the 
present), which is also when the firm is liquidated. In the intervening periods 
there are no net cash flows or dividends paid to the shareholders. Black and 
Scholes (1973) observe that under this set of simplifying assumptions, the 
common stock can be regarded as a European call option, where the underlying 
asset is the firm. The owner of a call option has claim to the slice of a stock’s 
price distribution to the right of the exercise price at maturity date T. Similarly, a 
firm’s stockholders have claim to the slice of the firm’s distribution to the right of 
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the face value of the firm’s debt at its maturity date. The stockholders can be 
viewed as holding an option to buy back the firm from the bondholders for an 
exercise price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt C at time T. If the value of 
the firm at maturity VT   is above C, the equity will have a positive value; if it is 
below, the stock is valueless. In other words, the stockholders have protection 
against depreciation of the firm’s value below C (the limited liability nature of 
equity) and have a right to any appreciation in the firm’s value above C.  
The Black-Scholes option pricing model for European-type options can 
then be applied to the equity of the firm. 
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and 
Tdd s-= 12 .                                                                                                    (4) 
where V is the current value of the firm,  s2 is the instantaneous variance of 
percentage returns on V, C is the face value of the debt which is the exercise price 
of the option, T is the time to maturity, rF is the riskless interest rate, and ( )·N  is 
the standardized normal cumulative probability density function. 
Assuming that the firm’s asset value is unaffected by its capital structure it 
can be shown that the debt of the firm has the value 
SVD -= .                                                                                                             (5) 
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Merton (1974) further shows that 
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Using the comparative static results derived for call options by Black-Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1973), the effect of the parameters of the Option Pricing 
Model on the value of the stock can be studied. It can be shown that  
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This means that the value of the stock is an increasing function of the 
value of the firm, the riskless interest rate, the variance of the percentage return of 
the firm, and time to liquidation; and it is a decreasing function of the face value 
of the debt. 
Galai and Masulis (1976) prove that if the systematic risk of the firm ? V 
is constant over time, then the instantaneous risk of the equity will not necessarily 
be stable or known with certainty for the time period in question. Combining the 
results of CAPM and that of the OPM, they prove that  
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The systematic risk of the equity is greater than or equal to the systematic risk of 
the firm (for bV > 0). If the systematic risk of the firm is assumed to be stationary, 
then the equity’s systematic risk will be nonstationary and 
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Combining this with ( ) ( )21, dNCedVNDSVD
TrF-+-=-=  yields the result  
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This in turn leads to  GS
A
S bb >  and 
G
D
A
D bb >  if the leverage of the firm increases. 
Let us assume that firm G is composed of two economically independent 
divisions A and B. Since the two divisions are economically independent, then 
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At time 0, assume that firm G unexpectedly spins off division B, so that G is now 
composed solely of division A. The capital structure design of the new firm entity 
B is such that the distribution of the debt of firm G to firm B is not proportional to 
the assets distributed. This assumption is not critical as long as even if there is a 
proportional distribution of debt to assets between the parent firm G and firm B, 
the riskiness of the assets distributed among the two firms is not the same. Post 
spin-off the variance of the cash flows of the parent firm G is much higher than 
the pre spin-off variance. Let, 
AG CC = .                                                                                                             (14) 
where CA is the face value of debt maturing at time T. As a result of the spin-off 
the debtholders of A (who were the original debtholders of firm G) find that their 
position has deteriorated because fewer assets now serve as collateral for the debt. 
Furthermore, the leverage V/C of the firm has gone up due to the loss in assets, so 
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D bb > , since b  is increasing in leverage as shown in the 
previous chapter. 
Moreover, the variance of the firm’s rate of return will, in general, change 
)22( GA ss ¹  due to the spin-off. If  
22
GA ss > , then it can be proved that 
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and GA SS 00 > 3. The proof is based on the fact that option value is an increasing 
function of the variance of the underlying security.  Even, if we assume, for 
simplicity, that the variance remains constant, i.e., 22 GA ss = , the change in the 
betas yields  
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Along with Eq. (13) this implies that 
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Thus, the value of the holdings of the equityholders of firm G, who now own 
equity in firms A and B, will increase at the expense of firm G’s debtholders. 
2.4.2. The combined Option Pricing Model and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
applied to pricing of securities in mergers 
Galai and Masulis (1976) extend the option pricing and CAPM analysis to 
the case of conglomerate mergers. They investigate the effects of a pure 
conglomerate merger in a perfect capital market on the values of the equity and 
debt of the two firms involved in the transaction. As the merger is defined as a 
conglomerate type, they assume that there is no economic synergy effect.  They 
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prove that merger of two firms (A and B) with less than a perfect correlation of 
their returns will decrease the variance of the new combined firm and thus reduce 
the value of the unprotected equity and increase the market value of debt. The risk 
of the combined firm G is smaller than that facing each of the individual firms, A 
and B, separately. Therefore the market value of firm G’s bonds is greater than 
the sum of the market values of the bonds of firms A and B. Their promised 
terminal values are the same. On the other hand, the market value of firm G’s 
stock is smaller than the sum of the values of firms A and B’s stock by an equal 
amount. 
Thus in the case of a conglomerate merger, if investors are unprotected 
against changes in the volatility of their holdings, the value of their holdings 
might be changed. The underlying assumptions are that each bond of the two 
original firms is exchanged for a bond of identical face value, with the same 
seniority and maturity, and guaranteed by the new firm. Also, stock in the new 
firm is distributed according to the relative equity value of the two firms before 
the merger is announced. Under these assumptions the stockholders’ position can 
be expected to deteriorate with the unanticipated announcement of a merger 
between A and B, due to the lower variance of the new firm G’s rate of return. 
The bondholders of the merged firm G have a decreased risk of bankruptcy. 
Rubinstein (1973) points out that bondholders of the merged firm receive more 
protection since the stockholders of each of the merging firm have to back the 
claims of the bondholders of both companies. The stockholders’ limited liability 
is weakened. 
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Galai and Masulis (1976) suggest that an alternative solution to this 
refinancing problem is to retire the existing debt of the merging firms (A and B) 
and then to issue firm in the new combined entity G with a market value equal to 
the preexisting debt of firms A and B. An interesting question also is how security 
holders will be compensated so that they will have no incentive to block a 
conglomerate merger. One way to answer this is by issuing more debt with the 
same seniority and retiring a certain fraction of the merged firm’s equity. By 
doing so, the value of the original bonds will decline. This process can be 
continued until the original bondholders’ holdings have a market value identical 
to their combined market value before the merger took place. The net result will 
be an increase in the debt-equity ratio of the merged firm. In other words, by 
increasing the debt-equity ratio of the merged firm, the market values of the  
original security holders can be restored to their pre-merger levels. This is 
consistent with the claim that mergers "allow” firms to increase their "debt 
capacity." In a world with corporate taxes where interest payments are tax 
deductible, an increase in debt capacity increases the firm’s after tax value. This 
helps explain the motivation behind the large number of conglomerate mergers 
that are observed. 
Galai and Masulis’s (1976) results are based on both firms having a single 
pure discount bond outstanding, with identical seniority and maturity dates, and 
the same leverage ratios. Shastri (1990) examines the sensitivity of the results to 
these assumptions. He analyzes the financial effects of an exchange offer merger 
between two firms with differing capital structures and riskiness. Using Geske’s 
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(1977) compound option framework, Shastri extends the Galai-Masulis (1976) 
analysis to allow for possible wealth redistribution between all security holders 
(i.e., between bondholders and stockholders) and between all classes of 
bondholders. His analyses decomposes the effect of mergers on the values of the 
outstanding bonds of the two combining firms and on the value of their common 
stock into five main components: 
1. The variance effect, which is a result of the change in the variance of returns 
on the firm; 
2. The leverage effect, which is caused by a change in the face value of debt-to-
firm value ratio; 
3. The maturity effect, which is caused by the different maturities of the 
outstanding bonds of the two combining firms; 
4. The asset structure effect which is caused by the change in variance due to the 
retirement of the outstanding bond with the shorter maturity; 
5. The synergy effect, which is caused by the fact that the market value of the 
combined firm is greater than the combined market values of each of the 
merging firm. 
Shastri’s (1990) simulation results suggest that, in most cases, the effect of 
the decreased variance dominates the effects of leverage and seniority. He also 
extends the pure-discount coupon case to coupon bonds and finds the basic results 
unchanged. 
Most studies of bondholder wealth effects in spin-offs and mergers 
acquisitions have focused on the wealth transfer effects. However the next chapter 
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motivates how a restructuring of a firm’s business units can bring about more than 
a simple transfer of wealth between shareholders and bondholders. A 
restructuring affects the firm structure in a number of ways. The resulting 
bondholder wealth effect is a net effect of the various changes in the firm’s 
characteristics. This dissertation develops a model of bondholder wealth effects in 
corporate restructurings by decomposing the net effect into its component effects. 
The linkage between the effects of the restructuring on the firm level 
characteristics and the effect on bondholder wealth is studied at the component 
level. This allows the model to test for both positive and negative effects of 
restructurings on bondholder wealth within the same framework. 
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Chapter 3: Developing the parameters of the model of effects of 
corporate restructurings on bondholder wealth  
A spin-off occurs when a company distributes the common shares it owns 
in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders, thereby creating a separate 
public company (see Fig.1). At the time of the spin-off, the subsidiary becomes a 
stand-alone public entity that is administratively and financially independent of 
the parent. In effect, the consolidated firm is divided into two (or more) firms with 
an identical set of shareholders. In contrast to divestitures that typically involve an 
infusion of funds into the parent corporation, no external financing is raised in a 
spin-off and neither firm revalues its assets. 
A spin-off is generally tax-free if it satisfies the following criteria set forth 
in Chapter 355 of the Internal Revenue Code: (1) The distribution must contribute 
at least 80% of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary, and the shares retained by 
the parent should not constitute “practical control” of the subsidiary (i.e., if after 
the spin-off the parent retains no more than a 20% interest in the voting power of 
all classes of voting stock and no more than a 20% interest in each class of non-
voting stock); (2) both the parent and the subsidiary must be engaged in an active 
trade or business for at least five years prior to the ex-date; and (3) the transaction 
is done for sound business reasons and not as a means of avoiding taxes. Due to 
the strong tax incentive, most spin-offs involve the near complete divestiture of 
the subsidiary. 
Since there is a pro-rata distribution of shares with all shareholders of the 
parent company receiving shares of the new entity, continuity of ownership is 
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maintained and any change in equity value because of the reorganization accrues 
to the pre spin-off equity holders. 
  
3.1. SPIN-OFFS AND BONDHOLDERS 
Since a conventional spin-off involves a “no-money” transaction, it is in 
effect a give-away of some of the company stock in the form of a dividend to 
current shareholders.  Also since a part of the parent's projects are now 
redeployed under the spun-off unit, it is more than likely that the variance of the 
parent firm’s cash flows changes thereby manifesting an asset substitution. 
Spin-offs could also be structured such that the parent spins-off the 
subsidiary so as to use the subsidiary's assets in a financial strategy. There have 
been many spin-offs where the parent has retained a portion of the stock in the 
spun-off unit. This is distinct from equity carveouts where the parent firm sells 
equity in a subsidiary by taking it public thereby generating cash inflows for the 
parent. In a spin-off where the parent retains a control, there are no cash inflows 
to the parent because of the spin-off, however the parent acquires equity in a 
publicly traded firm created as a result of the spin-off. The parent can then use 
this equity as collateral (i.e., as an asset in fulfilling the parent company’s 
financial requirements) for both external and continuing operations. In a tight 
money market, the  parent can use the majority-owned stock in a public spun-off 
subsidiary as collateral to raise new borrowings. To the extent the new debt has 
the same or higher priority and is secured by the collateral created by the 
restructuring of assets under the spun-off unit, the old bondholders suffer a claim 
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dilution. This dilution exists since part of the assets underlying their claims has 
now been spun-off to serve as collateral for the new debt. 
The stockholder-bondholder conflict in spin-offs centers around the event 
where the shares of the new entity are now distributed solely to the stockholders 
of the parent corporation. Bondholders of the firm do not get any claims to the 
assets of the new firm. In effect, stockholders use these transactions to move 
assets beyond the reach of bondholders. 
For example, Marriott’s spin-off  (Parrino, 1997; Stark et al., 1994) is a 
case that highlights bondholder-shareholder conflicts. Marriott announced its plan 
on October 5, 1992 to spin-off, through a special dividend, into two separate 
publicly traded companies called Marriott International, Inc. and Host Marriott. 
The spin-off was accomplished through a tax-free dividend of one share of 
common stock of Marriott International for each outstanding share of common 
stock of Marriott. Marriott International consisted of Marriott’s management 
services businesses, which represented the profitable portion of Marriott’s assets. 
Host Marriott consisted of the remainder of the Marriott Corporation including 
the real estate portfolio and the airport/toll road concession operations, which 
constituted the financially weaker and unprofitable parts of Marriott’s business. 
As originally described by Marriott, once the transaction was consummated, 
Marriott International would account for over 50% of Marriott’s operating cash 
flow while Host Marriott was to be left with about $2.9 billion in debt and less 
than 50% of Marriott’s operating cash flow. The Marriott spin-off's structure 
suggests that the division of debt, assets, and operating income between the parent 
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and the subsidiary can greatly affect the wealth distribution between bondholders 
and stockholders. In this case, intensely hostile bondholder response to the spin-
off did force Marriott to make some concessions. Stark et al. (1994) note that 
“Marriott’s spin-off is not an isolated event but rather is a reflection of an 
ongoing, perhaps perpetual, conflict of economic interests between bondholders 
and stockholders” (p. 523). 
The bondholder litigation following the Marriott spin-off highlighted the 
event risk that debtholders of a firm face when the firm restructures through spin-
offs. One of the responses observed in the bond markets which impacts the wealth 
of the bondholders is the effect that the restructuring has on the rating of the 
outstanding debt. 
In Bloomberg Business News there are reports regarding companies that 
announced spin-offs between the October 7, 1992 Marriott announcement and 
November 15, 1994. Stark et al. (1994) examine the actions, if any, taken by the 
rating agencies after spin-off announcements. They find that of the approximately 
49 companies that announced a spin-off, 17 companies had an announcement that 
coincided with a rating agency action. Of the 17 spin-offs, seven firms had their 
ratings put on credit watch with negative implications ascribed to the spin-off 
announcement. One had its ratings put on credit watch with negative implications 
by one agency but affirmed by another, while two had their ratings downgraded or 
put on credit watch with negative implications due to market factors other than 
the spin-off announcement. Of the rest, six had their ratings affirmed and one had 
its ratings put on credit watch with positive implications. 
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The initial rating agency response of putting a company on credit watch 
with negative implications coupled with the spin-off announcement could have an 
immediate negative effect on the market price at which debt trades. Such actions 
create obvious problems for bondholders in the short-term, even if the rating is 
subsequently affirmed and the price recovers.  Another significant problem is the 
decrease in market value, which depending on the time at which the decrease 
occurs, can reflect on the financial statements of the holder, even if the price 
subsequently recovers. Another potential source of loss to bondholders is the 
possible drop in liquidity of the bond trades as a result of the response of the 
rating agencies to the spin-off. 
Some examples of spin-offs that were proposed in the period following the 
Marriott spin-off and that affected debtholders are Skybox International, Litton 
Industries, Ethyl Corporation, and AT&T (See Appendix). These examples 
highlight the potential for loss in bondholder wealth that exists as a result of the 
immediate response in the bond markets to the spin-off announcement. 
A number of studies show the wealth effects of spin-offs on stockholders 
including Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983), Miles and 
Rosenfeld (1983), Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993), Desai and Jain (1999). 
Relatively few researchers examine the reactions in the bond markets. Those that 
do include Schipper and Smith (1983), Hite and Owers (1983), Parrino (1997), 
Dittmar (2000), Maxwell and Rao (2002). The empirical evidence seems to 
indicate that parent company shareholders gain and the bondholders are 
unaffected by the spin-off. Although Parrino (1997) shows significant loses to 
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bondholders following the announcement of the 1993 Marriott spin-off. The 
present study focuses on the effects of restructurings through spin-offs as well as 
mergers and acquisitions on the wealth of the existing holders of the outstanding 
publicly traded nonconvertible bonds of the parent/acquirer firms.  
 
3.2. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND BONDHOLDERS  
There exists a vast body of research devoted to examining the returns to 
stockholders of merging firms. However, a fundamental unresolved controversy 
still exists concerning the impact of corporate merger/acquisition on the wealth of 
the debtholders of the merging partners. 
Lewellen (1971) was the first to advance the idea of the co-insurance 
effect for corporate debt in a corporate merger. He argues that the joining-together 
of two or more firms whose earnings streams were less-than-perfectly correlated 
would reduce the risk of default of the merged firms (i.e., the co- insurance effect) 
and thereby increase the “debt capacity” or “borrowing ability” of the combined 
enterprise. He concludes that the increased total borrowing capacity of the 
resulting firm, in combination with the effect of tax-deductible interest payments, 
provides an economic incentive for shareholder-wealth-maximizing firms to 
engage in a merger. However, Lewellen did not examine the impact of the co-
insurance effect on the value of the merging firm’s already outstanding debt. 
Higgins and Schall (1975) and Galai and Masulis (1976) extend 
Lewellen’s analysis to show that the co-insurance effect can lead to an increase in 
the market value of the merging firms’ debt and a concomitant decline in the 
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market value of their equity. Thus, the net financial result of non-synergistic 
mergers would be a wealth transfer from stockholders to debtholders. They 
conclude that unless firms can neutralize this wealth transfer they should not 
engage in a merger. Kim and McConnell (1977) propose that if corporate mergers 
produce a coinsurance effect and if firms are controlled by stockholders (or if 
managers at least seek to maintain shareholders’ wealth, i.e., shareholder-wealth 
protecting firms), then we expect to observe merging firms taking steps to 
neutralize the wealth-transfer from stockholders to debtholders. One option which 
merging firms could avail is to increase their use of financial leverage to the point 
where the post-merger default risk of the previously outstanding debt is increased 
sufficiently to negate the co- insurance effect and to cancel any wealth transfers 
from equityholders to debtholders. Therefore, we would observe that (a) 
bondholders of merging firms do not earn any abnormal returns around the time 
of merger and (2) merged firms increase their use of financial leverage relative to 
the participating firms’ pre-merger financial leverage.  
Although financial theorists have examined corporate mergers from many 
different perspectives, most models predict one of two primary effects. Either    
(1) a merger creates net new wealth from operating or financial synergies, or  
(2) firms redistribute existing wealth between stakeholder classes. 
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs highlights the theories concerning 
wealth-transfers and creation of financial synergies. Financial synergies can arise 
from: (1) reduction of default risk (and thus borrowing costs) by joining together 
firms with imperfectly correlated cash flow streams, (2) diversification of equity 
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risk for stockholders, or (3) contrasting efficiencies created by allowing managers 
to reduce their employment risk by creating larger, less risky firms. If net wealth 
is created in mergers by the capture of operating and/or financial synergies, there 
should be an increase in the summed market value of the combined firm’s 
securities. And most or all of this net synergistic gain should accrue to 
stockholders, the firm’s residual claimants. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Bhagat et al. (1990), and Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) generally predict that operating synergies will be created only in 
mergers between firms in the same or related industries. Meanwhile, Healey et al. 
(1992) shows particularly strong performance improvements for mergers 
involving firms with overlapping businesses. Models predicting the creation of 
financial synergies, such as those presented in Levy and Sarnat (1970), Lewellen 
(1971), Amihud and Lev (1981), and Amihud et al. (1986), almost invariably 
assume that these synergies are found only in conglomerate mergers, or mergers 
between firms in different industries. According to Higgins and Schall (1975), a  
conglomerate merger is defined as one that produces no benefits or diseconomies 
from changes in methods of producing the firm’s goods and services. Because 
conglomerate mergers, in general, neither reduce competition nor provide 
operating economies of scale, it is often assumed that these mergers do not yield 
any operating synergies or create product or factor market power. Yet they can 
increase a firm’s debt capacity or create other types of financial benefits. 
In contrast to synergistic wealth creation, wealth redistributions are 
usually expected to occur when a merger merely changes the relative riskiness of 
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the cash flow streams of two or more securities. The theoretical models of 
Higgins and Schall (1975) and Galai and Masulis (1976) suggest that 
conglomerate mergers will lower equity values and raise bond values, leaving 
total firm value unchanged. Shastri (1990) shows that these mergers can have 
many different effects, such as wealth redistributions from stockholders to 
bondholders (or vice versa) or within security holder classes depending upon the 
covariance between the returns of the merging firms. Although most prior 
theoretical models of the financial effects of mergers suggest that these effects 
would be observed in conglomerate mergers, there is also no reason that financial 
synergies could not be found in mergers between firms in the same or related 
industries. It is possible that the covariance of returns is likely to be higher in 
similar- industry combinations and thus the opportunity for financial synergies is 
presumed to be lower. 
In summation, there are three theoretical types of effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on the wealth of the bondholders: 
1. A synergy effect where bondholders share some of the synergy with 
shareholders (if synergy exists). 
2. A coinsurance effect where bondholders benefit because the firm’s risk 
decreases due to imperfect correlation between cash flows of acquirer and 
target firms. 
3. An incentive effect where bondholders lose because shareholders (as 
represented by management) have incentives to expropriate the wealth of 
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bondholders by raising the firm’s risk through increases either in operating 
risk or in leverage. 
 
3.3. CHANGES IN THE FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS DUE TO THE SPIN-OFF 
AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE FIRM’S EXISTING BONDHOLDERS 
Based on the theoretical models described in chapter 2 and the discussion 
of the potential effects of spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions on bondholders  
in sections 3.1. and 3.2., it is an empirical question whether spin-offs have any 
effect on the wealth of bondholders and if so, then the degree of the magnitude of 
these effects must be determined. The various reasons why bondholders may be 
affected negatively by a spin-off or a merger are discussed above. The following 
discussion provides the reasons as to how and when bondholders gain by a spin-
off or a merger, and develops the parameters of a comprehensive model to study 
both negative as well as positive bondholders’ wealth effects of spin-offs and 
mergers and acquisitions.  
3.3.1. Potential benefits of spin-offs to bondholders  
The wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders is not the only 
possible bondholder wealth effect arising from a spin-off. Spin-offs may increase 
overall firm value by providing gains either from relaxation of regulatory or tax 
constraints (Schipper and Smith, 1983,  Hite and Owers, 1983, from the undoing 
of an unwise takeover (Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed, 1995), or from 
improved operating efficiency of the parent firm resulting from the decrease in the 
number and diversity of transactions under one management (Schipper and Smith, 
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1983, Hite and Owers, 1983, Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997). The spin-
off gains can also result from a maximization of managerial incentives. The spin-
off of a division allows the managers of that division to have stock options and 
other incentives in a situation over which they have more direct control. Improved 
managerial motivation could then lead to improved performance of the subsidiary. 
Spin-offs can prove an effective redeployment tool boosting the parent profit and 
loss statement. This happens when these numbers are reviewed under accounting 
rules, which require a pro rata share of “controlled” subsidiary earnings to be 
included in the consolidated profit and loss statement of the parent. If certain tests 
are met, “control” is present even if the ownership is only 10%. The parent can 
thus spin-off up to 90% while still maintaining the benefit of control ownership. 
Spin-off gains due to improved economic efficiency or the removal of 
negative synergies would prove to be beneficial to all stakeholders. If as a result 
of the spin-off the profitability of the firm improves, then from the bondholders’ 
viewpoint there is a decrease in the probability that the parent firm would default 
on any payments (interest and principal) due to bondholders. The risk of 
bondholders' investments in the parent firm decreases. Therefore, one might 
expect returns on the outstanding bonds of the parent firm to exhibit a positive 
response to a spin-off in which the post spin-off operational efficiency of the 
parent improves. 
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3.3.2. Capital structure changes 
According to the information content motivation for spin-offs, if spin-offs 
improve firm value for the parent and the subsidiary by conveying information 
that is otherwise not available to investors, then both bondholders and 
shareholders should benefit. If the firms issue new equity post-spin-off, then the 
bondholders should also benefit by the increase in the equity underlying their 
asset claims. However, the benefit to the bondholders will depend on 1) the  
distribution of debt between the parent and the subsidiary and 2) whether new 
equity is issued by the entity bearing the higher proportion of the debt (i.e., the 
proportional distribution of the equity and debt post-spin-off). Thus the effect of 
the spin-offs on the wealth of the shareholders and the bondholders of the parent 
(subsidiary) will be determined by the tradeoff between the asset reallocation and 
the improvement in the equity base as a result of the spin-off. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) provide evidence on the capital 
raising activities of a sample of spin-off firms for up to three years before and 
three years after the completion of a spin-off. They find that in each of the three 
years before a spin-off, the frequency of issuance for the sample firms is 
statistically indistinguishable from that of their size and industry-matched control 
firms. However, in the first two years following spin-offs, the firms that engage in 
spin-offs issue equity more frequently than firms that do not engage in spin-offs. 
Also among firms that engage in spin-offs, the frequency of equity issuance 
increases following a spin-off. For the sample firms, in the two years after a spin-
off, they find a total of 30 equity issues compared to only 20 in the two years 
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before the spin-off, the difference being significant at the 10% level. Firms that 
divest through spin-offs raise more amounts of equity and debt in dollar terms 
than their size and industry-matched control firms. For instance, in the second 
year following spin-off completion, the sample firms raise on average about $7 
million more in equity and about $247 million more in debt than their size and 
industry matched control firms (difference significant at the 10% level). More 
importantly, the spin-off firms raise more capital following a spin-off compared to 
before the spin-off. In the two years following a spin-off, the mean debt (equity) 
raised is about $236 million ($25 million) higher than the mean debt (equity) 
raised in the two years before the spin-off. The difference in debt (equity) 
amounts is significant at the 10% (5%) level of significance. These results suggest 
that firms that engage in spin-offs raise more external capital following the spin-
offs. Moreover, in each of the three years before a spin-off they find that sample 
firms issue significantly more debt than their size and industry matched 
counterparts.  
As explained above, the new capital, debt or equity, raised by firms that 
have a spin-off can have negative or positive implications for the bondholders 
depending on the proportion of debt to assets distribution between the parent and 
the subsidiary. Also, if the parent firms spin-off the subsidiary with the intention 
of raising new debt, possibly because they can improve their debt-equity ratios by 
either a) transferring a higher proportion of debt to assets to the subsidiary or  b) 
divesting a division with higher business risks to lower the parent firm’s business 
risk for issuing new debt. In such a case the original debtholders stand to lose 
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because of the spin-off. Therefore, keeping all else constant, if the spin-off leaves 
the parent firm with a lower debt-to-asset ratio as compared to that in the pre-
spin-off period, then the bondholders of the parent firm should experience a 
positive response to the spin-off.  
The effects of the capital structure changes on the dis tribution of wealth 
also depend on characteristics of the parent-subsidiary pair. Dittmar (2000) finds 
that firms consider the costs and benefits of debt to the parent when determining 
the capital structure of the subsidiary, and the parents’ collateral va lues impact the 
allocation of debt to the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries in her sample have leverage 
ratios that are significantly lower than pre-spin-off leverage ratios, indicating that 
debt is not allocated proportionally to value. The leverage ratio of the parent may 
depend on characteristics of the subsidiary if the pre-spin-off firm allocates debt 
as a means to attempt to expropriate wealth from the debtholders. The pre-spin-
off firm allocates more debt to the parent if it is large and the subsidiary is small. 
The subsidiary and parent size influence the allocation of debt to the parent. 
Therefore the relative size of the subsidiary to the parent is used as a moderator in 
studying the changes in the capital structure of the parent firm in the model.  
Moreover, Stark et al. (1994) suggest that restructurings through spin-offs 
require a better capitalized ongoing business than that allowed by a leveraged 
buyout. This leads to the thought that the pre-spin-off capital structure of the 
parent firm could become an important criterion in developing a model for the 
wealth effects of spin-offs. 
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3.3.3. Focus vs. non-focus  
Desai and Jain (1999) note that the performance of focus- increasing spin-
offs is significantly different than the non-focus-increasing sample. While the 
focus-increasing firms continue to earn large positive abnormal returns following 
spin-offs, the abnormal returns of the non-focus- increasing firms are negative. In 
particular, the abnormal returns (based on size and industry-matched control 
firms) for the focus- increasing sample are 11.12%, 20.77%, and 33.36% over 
holding periods of one, two, and three years following spin-offs. The 
corresponding abnormal returns for the non-focus- increasing sample are –0.96%,  
–7.66%, and –14.34%. The results are similar when the parents and the 
subsidiaries are examined separately. Also the results are not driven by the firms 
that were taken over following spin-offs. This latter result is important because of 
the Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) hypothesis that spin-off gains occur 
because of the potential of mergers of either the parent or the subsidiary in the 
period following the spin-off.  
Desai and Jain (1999) also find that the operating performance of the firms 
(parents and the corresponding subsidiaries) undertaking focus- increasing spin-
offs improves in the post-spin-off period, while the non-focus increasing spin-offs 
exhibit negative (or close to zero) operating cash flow returns. Moreover, cross-
sectionally three-day and one-year abnormal returns are positively associated with 
change in focus and change in operating performance. Unlike non-focus-
increasing spin-offs, the focus-increasing spin-offs are associated with an increase 
in operating performance from the three year pre- to post-spin-off period. A 
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focus-increasing spin-off reduces the diversity of assets under management, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of the managers. This improved operating 
efficiency could result in value creation for all the stakeholders of the firm, 
including the bondholders and the shareholders. This suggests that the nature of 
wealth distribution in a spin-off could be affected by the focus- increasing/non-
focus-increasing nature of the distribution of the assets.  
Also the motivation behind a focus- increasing spin-off might be different 
than one behind a non-focus- increasing spin-off. Desai and Jain (1999) show that 
non-focus- increasing spin-offs are likely to be motivated by prior years’ poor 
performance and a high level of financial leverage. In the pre-spin-off period of 
years –1 to –3, the mean (median) financial leverage of the non-focus- increasing 
spin-off firms is 15.08% (10.23%) higher (statistically significant) than the 
benchmark. In the post-spin-off period, the median shows that the level of debt 
has been reduced considerably. The median level is only 1.42% (though the mean 
of 13.93% is still on the higher side). They find some evidence that the non-focus-
increasing spin-offs could be motivated by a high level of financial leverage prior 
to the spin-off, even though they do not offer any explanation as to how do the 
parents bring about the post-spin-off reduction in debt levels. They find that the 
post-spin-off median size- and industry-adjusted debt level for the parents and the 
subsidiaries separately is 1.48% and 5.75% respectively in a non-focus- increasing 
spin-off. Since they look at the industry-adjusted levels of debt in the pre- and 
post-spin-off years, a stronger test of any transfer of debt from the parent to the 
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subsidiary would be to look at the changes in the level across the pre- and post-
spin-off years.  
These differences among the performance of focus- increasing and non-
focus-increasing spin-offs suggest that a sample of spin-offs would differ in the 
wealth distribution effects across these two subsamples. Therefore, bond returns 
of the parent firms’ outstanding bonds should be positive for a spin-off that 
improves focus of the parent firm. Bond returns should be negative in a non-
focus-increasing spin-off. 
The wealth distribution in spin-offs might also be moderated by some 
additional factors. Slovin et al.  (1995) show that rivals of subsidiary firms that are 
spun-off have a significantly positive two-day excess return of 0.60% around the 
announcement day. Rivals of parent firms are not affected by the announcement. 
They note that if changes in corporate governance lead to an enhanced 
competitive position of the spun-off subsidiary and the parent firm as a result of 
improvement in economic efficiency, then share prices of rival firms of both the 
affected subsidiary and the parent firm should fall on announcement of the 
restructuring. The positive excess returns for rivals of subsidiaries, however, do 
not support the economic efficiency argument. Instead, the results support the 
view that this type of restructuring decision signals favorable information about 
the unit that has industry-common elements. However they do not provide any 
theoretical explanation of the nature of these industry-common elements. The 
implication for any model studying the distribution of wealth in spin-offs is to 
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include a control for industry while measuring any change in efficiency of the 
firms involved in the spin-off.  
Stark et al. (1994) believe that reports of heightened bondholder activism, 
in the wake of the Marriott spin-off, have led to greater attentiveness to 
bondholder concerns in a spin-off, examples being American Express Company’s 
spin-off of Lehman Brothers and Ryder System, Inc.’s spin-off of Aviall, Inc., 
both of which occurred in 1994. This suggests that the sample of spin-off firms 
pre-Marriott might have differences in wealth sharing than those observed in spin-
offs post-Marriott (October 1992 to October 1993). 
In the light of these findings, it would be useful to investigate how the 
behavior of firms vary with respect to their motivations (focus- increasing/non-
focus-increasing), and the relationship between profitability, new capital raised 
and motivations of the firms undertaking the spin-offs. A better understanding of 
the true motivations of the firms behind the spin-offs will lead to a much richer 
model of the distribution of wealth in spin-offs between shareholders and 
bondholders. 
 
3.4. CHANGES IN THE FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS DUE TO THE 
MERGER/ACQUISITION AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE FIRM’S 
EXISTING BONDHOLDERS  
The combined Option Pricing Model and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
applied to pricing of securities in mergers suggest that the difference between the 
post- and pre-merger values of the outstanding securities (common stock and 
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bonds) of the acquirer firm is made up of the following main components: the 
variance effect, the leverage effect, and the synergy effect. 
The variance effect: Since bond prices are a decreasing function of variance, 
bondholders will be worse off if the risk of the firm increases. If the acquirer had 
a lower (higher) variance than the combined firm, then all else being equal, there 
will be a decrease (increase) in the existing bonds of the acquirer as a result of the 
combination. 
The leverage effect: A change in the firm’s bankruptcy risk caused by a ceteris 
paribus change in the leverage ratio (defined as the ratio of face value of debt to 
firm value) will change the value of the firm’s outstanding bonds. If the leverage 
ratio of the acquiring firm after the acquisition is lower than its pre-merger value, 
then the merger results in a decrease in the leverage-ratio-related risk for the 
outstanding bonds of the acquirer, thereby increasing their value. 
The synergy effect: Any improvements in the operations of the firm as a result of 
the merger or acquisition would improve the ability of the firm to service its debt, 
thereby reducing the bankruptcy risk. Therefore bondholders could potentially 
benefit from any synergy gains. 
 
3.5. THE MODEL 
In an efficient securities market, if a restructuring is expected to change 
certain characteristics of the parent firm, then bondholders anticipating these 
changes, must react to the restructuring event. Based on the above arguments, the 
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following are the potential effects of a restructur ing through spin-offs or through a 
mergers/acquisition on bondholders of the parent firm: 
Increase in leverage: If the leverage of the parent or acquirer firm, as measured 
by the leverage ratio (total debt outstanding divided by total assets) or by the 
cash-flow coverage ratio (the ratio of cash flow from operations to interest 
expenses), increases as a result of the restructuring event, then bondholders would 
be expected to face a loss in wealth. 
Increase in riskiness: Post spin-off or merger/acquisition, if the variance of the 
parent or acquirer firm’s cash flows increases, then as the writers of a put option 
the bondholders would be expected to experience a decline in the value of their 
claims. 
Increase in overall value: If the operational efficiency of the parent firm (as 
measured by the ratios of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to sales, 
book, and market value of assets) improves, then any potential bondholder losses 
would be mitigated or possibly even turned into gains.  
The effects of a restructuring on the wealth of the existing bondholders of the 
parent or acquiring firms can be tested by the following model: 
 
 
Change in bondholder wealth = f( Pre-restructuring leverage, Post- restructuring 
change in leverage, Post-restructuring change in 
variability of cash flows, Post-restructuring 
operating performance, focus-increasing or non-
focus-increasing restructuring, size of the spun-
off (target) firm vis-à-vis the parent (acquirer), 
the proportion of debt to assets allocated to the 
subsidiary(target)). 
 51 
Chapter 4: Data 
 
4.1. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
4.1.1. Spin-off sample 
To identify the initial sample, the daily tapes of the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) were searched from 1980 to mid-1998 for spin-offs 
completed by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ. CRSP identifies nontaxable spin-offs 
with a distribution code of 3763. However, this code also applies to new issues of 
another class of shares by the same firms. All such cases that were not bona fide 
spin-offs are excluded. Publications such as the Moody's Dividend Records, 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Wall Street Journal as well as the online libraries of 
Lexis-Nexis were searched to screen the initial sample.  
The CRSP tapes listed 257 spin-offs completed between 1980 and April 30, 1998. 
Of these 26 firms were eliminated as new issues of another class of shares. This 
initial sample was further supplemented by spin-offs listed in the Security Data 
Company's (SDC) Worldwide Acquisitions database.4 The final sample consists of 
289 spin-offs announced and completed between 1979 and April 30, 1998.  Table 
1 lists the sample by the year of announcement and ex-dividend dates. The sample 
observations are well-dispersed throughout the sample period.    
                                                 
4 I would like to thank Amy Dittmar for sharing the sample of spin-offs announced between 1983 
and 1995, used in Dittmar (2000). 
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4.1.1.1.  Identification of dates 
The spin-off process follows a sequence of events highlighting several 
dates on which potentially important information is revealed to the markets. The 
first of these is the announcement date, which is the day on which the parent firm 
announces that it is considering a spin-off of part of its operations. Next, the firm 
works out the specifics of the spin-off and applies to the Internal Revenue Service 
for a ruling to determine if the distribution will be considered tax-free. 
Subsequently, the spin-off must be approved by vote of the board of directors 
and/or the shareholders. Occasionally, approval is required by state or federal 
regulatory authorities such as a public utility commission, the Federal Power 
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, state bank examiners, etc. 
The board of directors must declare the spin-off dividend and set the date of 
record and payment date and the exchange must set an ex-dividend date, after 
which the spun-off subsid iary is no longer a part of the parent firm. Thus the 
announcement date marks the beginning of the spin-off process, while the ex-
dividend date marks its culmination. 
The CRSP daily tapes provide the ex-dividend date. To identify the 
announcement date, the Wall Street Journal Index and the Wall Street Journal, as 
well as all the major newspapers and trade journals listed in the Lexis-Nexis 
Library were searched extensively for any news item relating to spin-offs. The ex-
dividend date was identified as a tentative press date, and all the data sources 
were checked for the current year and five previous years for an earlier report. If 
an earlier report was found, then the tentative press date was replaced and the 
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sources were checked for five more previous years. The earliest press date was 
finalized when there was found to be no previous mention in the current and the 
preceding five years. This earliest press date is then noted as the announcement 
date. For the sample of spin-offs announced and completed between 1979 and 
April 30, 1998, the average time between the announcement and the ex-dividend 
dates is six months.  
4.1.2. Mergers and acquisition sample 
The mergers and acquisition sample is identified as completed mergers in 
the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database during the period 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. The acquirer firms in this initial list are matched to the spin-off 
sample by year of announcement and industry of the parent firm involved in the 
spin-off. Table 1 describes the mergers and acquis ition data set by announcement 
and ex-date year. The matched acquirer firms are then screened for having 
nonconvertible, publicly traded debt outstanding from at least six months prior to 
the merger announcement until at least six months after the effective date of the 
merger. In the final screening, only matched acquirer firms having trader-quoted 
bond data available are included in the final sample. 
 
4.2.  CORPORATE BOND DATA 
The empirical evidence on the  effects of corporate restructurings through 
spin-offs or mergers and acquisitions on bondholder wealth is quite mixed. In 
light of the potential bondholder-shareholder conflicts enumerated in the earlier 
chapters, it is surprising that earlier literature finds no significant bond price 
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reactions to these corporate restructurings. In fact, with respect to spin-offs, they 
were viewed as less efficient in the transfer of value to stockholders than 
leveraged buyouts and therefore not seriously perceived as event risk transactions 
during the 1980s (Schipper and Smith, 1984). Studies showing the reactions in the 
bond markets face the challenge of acquiring historical bond data in the highly 
fragmented dealer market for corporate bonds. 
The market for listed corporate bonds is composed of two distinctly 
different segments including the exchange market and the over-the-counter 
market. Most bond trading is carried out in the dealer market where prices are 
proprietary. Publicly available data, such as that produced by bond trades on the 
NYSE, can be inadequate because these markets are extremely thin. In their study 
of the effects of leveraged buyouts on bondholders, Warga and Welch (1993) 
discuss the problem of availability of high-quality bond data and its impact on 
studies of bondholder wealth effects. Exchange prices may not accurately 
represent bond values in the dominant institutional markets. Using high-volume 
dealer market prices (instead of exchange prices or bond prices from commercial 
services) can show important differences in event studies. The authors find that 
dealer-market yields react sooner than exchange-based yields and can show 
statistically and economically more significant effects. 
The two sources of generally available price quotes are exchange prices 
(e.g., New York or American Stock Exchanges) and institutional prices from 
major over-the-counter bond dealers (e.g., Merrill Lynch). Exchange prices reflect 
primarily the odd- lot activities of individual investors (ten bonds or less per 
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transaction) and cover only a limited number of corporate issues and a negligible 
portion of the total trading. Institutional data is more comprehensive than 
exchange data. It covers a larger number of bonds, representing prices at which 
large positions could have been or were actually transacted. Most studies that use 
institutional prices use data from the Merrill Lynch Bond Price Service (often 
obtained indirectly through services such as Data Resources Incorporated or 
Bloomberg Financial Markets). These prices are not trader quotes but 
algorithmically determined “matrix” prices. The algorithms consist of rules that 
specify the addition of a fixed spread over either an actively traded benchmark 
issue of the same company, another company’s issue with similar rating, maturity, 
and coupon, or a U.S. Treasury issue. Commercial bond pricing services, such as 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, use a mix of exchange and matrix prices. 
Because exchange transactions are rare, these services rely heavily on matrix 
prices. 
Warga and Welch (1993) compare the results of event study on leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) that use of exchange data to the results obtained by using trader 
quotes. Warga and Welch compare the LBO event-window results obtained by 
using trader-quoted return data with those obtained by Asquith and Wizman 
(1990) by using S&P Bond guide data, for a set of 36 bonds from 13 companies 
that are common across both the studies. The event window is identical for both 
studies. Asquith and Wizman (1990), in their study on corporate buyouts find that 
46 bonds of companies involved in successful LBOs have a significant average 
risk-adjusted return of –3.2% in a fourth-month event window. In comparison, 
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Warga and Welch find that the S&P Bond Guide data produces a statistically 
significant risk-adjusted event-window drop of 3.83% only if RJR is included and 
if different bonds of a company are considered to be independent observations. 
When RJR is excluded from the sample or bonds of the same company are first 
properly aggregated (to one bond/firm), the average bond price only drops 
between 1.70% and 0.93% and becomes statistically insignificant. Furthermore, 
most of the risk-adjusted bond price drops are caused by increases in the risk-
adjusted benchmark. Unadjusted S&P returns are at best statistically 
insignificantly negative and at worst statistically significant positive. In contrast, 
by using the trader quotes, the risk-adjusted return drops are considerably larger, 
ranging from 5.00% to 7.30%, and always statistically significant. Even 
unadjusted returns are always negative, ranging from –2.32% to –4.60%.  
Although, they are statistically significant only when all 36 bonds are included as 
independent observations. 
Warga and Welch (1993) use in-house trader-quoted bid yields from 
Lehman Brothers. Trader-quoted bid prices represent commitments to purchase at 
least one hundred bonds (a round lot) and can coincide with an actual trade price 
if a trade occurred near the end of the day. Traders are not required to supply 
quotes if they have not made a trade recently. Since Lehman Brothers are a major 
trader of corporate bonds, this gives them a very comprehensive sample of bond 
prices for most firms that had a LBO during the period of their study. Their results 
document that bondholders experienced significant wealth losses in successful 
LBOs of the 1985 to1989 period. In their conclusion they observe that trader-
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quoted data is preferable in research investigating corporate bond reactions to 
firm-specific events. 
By using trader-quoted data from Lehman Brothers this study adds to the  
understanding of the reactions in the bond markets to restructurings. The use of 
trader quotes provides bond prices around the restructuring event that better 
reflect the response of investors in the bond markets to the changes in the parent/ 
acquirer firm. It is therefore possible for this study to analyze the wealth effects of 
corporate restructuring events on debtholders by using a more extensive sample of 
nonconvertible bonds and parent/acquirer pairs.  
4.2.1. Bond returns data set 
The Fixed Income Database (FID) from the University of Houston 
consists of month-end data on the individual bonds that comprise the Lehman 
Brothers Bond Indexes. This paper uses the version of FID covering the period 
from January 1, 1973 through February 28, 1998. In addition to reporting the 
month-end prices, yields and monthly returns, the database reports CUSIP, 
maturity, coupon, various call, put, and sinking fund information, and a business 
sector for each bond (e.g. industrial, utilities, or financial). Also reported are the 
monthly Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P) ratings for each bond. An initial 
sample of parent spin-off firms and the matched acquirer firms is identified as 
described below in chapters 4.2.1. and 4.2.2. This initial sample is further 
screened to include only those firms that have publicly traded, nonconvertible 
debt issues in the sample period and for which data is available in the historical 
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corporate bond database. This results in a sample of 45 spin-off parent firms with 
149 bonds and 144 matched acquirer firms with 790 bonds. 
The secondary market for corporate bonds is very illiquid compared to the 
stock market. Nunn, Hill, and Schneeweis (1986) and Warga (1991) discuss 
various implications of this illiquidity for researchers. The data set distinguishes 
between trader-quoted prices and matrix prices. Quote prices are bid prices 
established by Lehman traders. If a trader is unwilling to supply a bid price 
because the bond has not traded recently, a matrix price is computed using a 
proprietary algorithm. As demonstrated by Warga and Welch (1993), trader-
quoted prices are more likely to reflect all available information than are matrix 
prices. Therefore the analysis in this study uses only trader-quoted prices. 
Moreover Sarig and Warga (1989) show that as the liquidity of a bond decreases, 
the quality of the recorded prices deteriorates. They suggest that users of bond 
data employ some heuristic filters to screen out questionable observations. 
Following their recommendations, this study uses a filter to eliminate bonds that 
do not have a consecutive time series of exclusively trader-quoted returns around 
the announcement period. This ensures that all bonds in the sample are highly 
liquid and the market response to the spin-off announcement is fully reflected in 
the bond prices. After screening through the above filters, the spin-off sample 
comprises 37 parent firms with 123 publicly traded nonconvertible bonds which 
have bond data available in the month of the spin-off announcement, while the 
matched acquirer firms sample includes 133 firms having 619 outstanding bonds. 
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Tables 2 and 3 lay out the various steps involved in the sampling procedure and 
enumerate the sample size at its various stages. 
The sample size concurs with those used in other spin-off and merger and 
acquisition studies over similar time periods, as well with the sample size of 
studies using bond price data. Although the stringenc ies of the screening criteria 
limit the sample size, especially for the spin-off sample, it is felt that a sample 
with a series of trader quotes around the announcement period would provide 
more meaningful results than a larger sample with matrix prices. Table 4 gives the 
sample size of some comparable studies on spin-offs. 
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Chapter 5: Bond market reaction to the restructuring 
announcement  
The first of the hypotheses to be tested is whether restructurings through 
spin-offs or mergers and acquisitions have any effect on the bondholders of the 
parent or acquirer firms. To test this hypothesis, the bond returns of the 123 bonds 
of the 37 parent firms of the spin-off sample and of the 619 bonds of the 133 
matched acquirer firms are examined for a period of 12 months before and after 
the spin-off and merger announcement.  
 
5.1. METHODOLOGY 
The average length of time from announcement to ex-dividend date for the 
firms in the spin-off sample is six months, while for the matched merger and 
acquisition sample this period is around four months. Since information could be 
revealed to the markets over the entire period from the announcement date to the 
completion of the spin-off (Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers, 1987), an event 
window of six months is considered. Brown and Warner (1980) point out the 
choice of event dates is crucial. Asquith (1981) demonstrates that the merger date 
(ex-date) is not nearly as accurate as the announcement date in analyzing stock 
market reaction to mergers. Asquith shows that the time lag between the 
announcement date and the merger date (ex-date) varies widely from merger to 
merger. When the merger date is used for analysis, this variable time lag creates 
so much noise that even if there is a systematic movement in security prices, 
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statistical tests may not detect it. The month of the announcement date is treated 
as "month 0". Both raw and adjusted bond returns are examined. Most of the prior 
studies have examined only the raw returns. However to adjust the bond returns 
for contemporaneous market movements, it is essential to compare the raw returns 
with suitable benchmarks. 
     Financial researchers have used a wide variety of models to calculate 
abnormal bond returns such as mean-adjusted returns, market models, excess 
returns over U.S. government securities, bond indices (Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 
1984; Harrison and Grudnitski, 1987; Walker, 1991, 1994; Dittmar, 2000). Since 
a spin-off might change the variance of a firm's cash flows, it is not prudent to 
assume that the beta of the firm is unaffected by the spin-off. Therefore risk-
adjustment procedures for bonds that require calculating a parameter like beta are 
avoided. Moreover when employing monthly bond returns, calculating a beta is 
problematic because salient bond characteristics (e.g., maturity, variance) can 
change substantially over the number of periods necessary to use for parameter 
estimation. 
     A control portfolio approach is employed, where control bonds are 
matched on bond rating, maturity and industry sector. For each month two types 
of benchmark- indices series are constructed: 1) risk-and-maturity adjusted returns 
(risk-maturity adjusted) and 2) industry-and-maturity adjusted returns (industry-
maturity adjusted). The risk-maturity adjusted benchmark would capture any 
systematic changes in yields of bonds of similar risk and maturity characteristics, 
while the industry-maturity adjusted benchmark would capture any industry 
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effects on the bond yields.  For each bond, the return of an equivalent benchmark 
index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return. The risk-maturity 
adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate 
Bond indexes in the dimensions of risk and maturity. The ten Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond indexes contained all public fixed-rate nonconvertible domestic 
debt. The indexes were divided into AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BB bonds and 
within each ranking into a long-term index and an intermediate term index. The 
industry-maturity benchmark is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate 
Bond indexes in the dimensions of corporate sectors and maturity. The corporate 
sectors rankings are industrial, utility, and finance. Each ranking is further divided 
into a long-term index and an intermediate term index. 
     FID gives the monthly total return for each bond as 
Rit = [(Pe + Ae) - (Pb + Ab) + coupon payment] / MVb.                                      (17) 
     where Rit= Monthly total Return for bond i in month t, 
   Pb = beginning price, 
   Pe = ending price, 
              MVb = beginning market value, 
  Ab = beginning accrued interest, and 
  Ae = ending accrued interest. 
The monthly abnormal return for bond i at month t is calculated as 
 ARit = Rit – Rpt                                                                                                 (18) 
where Rpt  is the monthly total return for the index. 
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Following the methodology in Barber and Lyon (1997), the cumulative abnormal 
return for t periods is computed as 
å=
t
t it
ARitCAR
.                                                                    (19) 
To test the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative abnormal return is equal to 
zero for a sample of n firms, the parametric test statistic employed is: 
 
)/)(/( nitCARitCARCARt s=                                                                        (20) 
 
where itCAR is the sample average and )( itCARs  is the cross-sectional sample 
deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
report that for stock returns, if the sample is drawn randomly from a normal 
distribution, the test statistics follow a Student's t-distribution under the null 
hypothesis. 
During the event period, a number of the firms in the sample have more 
than one bond outstanding. Since it is possible that bond returns from the same 
company could be highly correlated, the results are reported in two ways: 1) using 
all individual bonds separately, and 2) on a per firm basis by first aggregating 
across all bonds from the same company and then by analyzing across the cross-
section of firms. These methods provide two extreme bounds on the significance 
of the reported results. Under the assumption that companies' bond returns are 
perfectly correlated (uncorrelated), the aggregated (individual) results provide 
valid inference. 
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5.2. RESULTS FOR SPIN-OFF SAMPLE 
5.2.1. Bond returns and spin-offs 
The risk-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal returns are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 reports the results for all bonds, while Table 6 reports the 
result on a firm level. The risk-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal return is 
significantly negative in the month of the announcement both at the all bond level 
and at the firm level. For all bonds, the monthly risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal 
return in the month of the announcement is –0.2642 that is significant at the 1% 
level. The 37 firms that have bond returns in announcement month exhibit a  
monthly risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal return of –0.2509, significant at the 1% 
level. The results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the announcement of the spin-off 
has a significant effect on the parent firm’s bonds. This is further supported by the 
significant cumulative abnormal returns reported in Table 7. 
Fig. 2 displays the distribution of the risk-maturity-adjusted monthly 
abnormal bond returns for all firms and bonds in the sample for 12 months around 
the spin-off announcement. For most months around the spin-off announcement, 
the average monthly abnormal return is negative. 
The industry-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal returns are significant 
around the announcement period. Table 8 reports the results for all bonds, while 
Table 9 reports the results on a firm level. Furthermore, the cumulative abnormal 
returns (industry-maturity adjusted) for various periods around the spin-off 
announcement reported in Table 10 are also significant.  
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This significant effect of the spin-off announcement is different from that 
reported in some prior studies. Schipper and Smith (1983) examine bond price 
reactions of the outstanding nonconvertible bonds for four firms (16 bonds) for 
which bond prices are reported in the Wall Street Journal on the day of the 
announcement and the day before the announcement. They report only the 
frequency of firms (bonds) that have a bond price increase or decrease in response 
to the announcement. The bond price decreases for two firms (8 nonconvertible 
bonds), while there is no change in bond price of one firm (2 nonconvertible 
bonds). For one firm, there is both an increase and a decrease in the prices of its 
outstanding nonconvertible bonds. They examine bond rating changes for 
convertible as well as nonconvertible bonds of the sample firms. They find that 
only two of the 19 bonds (one firm) experience a decline in bond rating the year 
after the spin-off announcement.  Schipper and Smith interpret the low sample 
frequency of declines in bond prices and ratings associated with spin-off 
announcement not to be suggestive of a widespread reduction in bondholder 
collateral. Hite and Owers (1983) study the reactions of 15 nonconvertible bonds 
in their sample to the spin-off announcement by calculating excess returns for 
only a period of 10 days around the spin-off announcement using exchange 
prices. They collect senior security price data from the Wall Street Journal and 
Compuserve Inc. Hite and Owers report a mean cumulative prediction error of – 
0.002 (test-statistic –0.13) in the 10 days around the announcement. As noted in 
chapter 4.1.1. most of the bond trades take place in the over-the-counter markets, 
and exchange market data does not adequately reflect the immediate reactions in 
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the bond markets. With exchange data, even a ten-day window around the spin-
off announcement might fail to capture the true reactions in the bond markets to 
the spin-off announcement. It is therefore not surprising that both these studies do 
not report any significant reaction in the bond markets to the spin-off 
announcement. In his study of the effect of the Marriott spin-off on the firm’s 
bondholders, Parrino (1997) uses dealer bid prices and  observes a significant 
decline in  the prices of all of Marriott’s fixed- income securities during the three 
days following the spin-off announcement. Moreover, because of the difference in 
time periods, it may not be possible to directly compare the results of this study to 
those of previous studies. The studies of Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite and 
Owers (1983) analyze spin-offs announced primarily during the 1960s and 1970s, 
while this study examines spin-offs announced in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The significant abnormal returns to bondholders of my study are 
consistent with those observed by Maxwell and Rao (2002). Using the FID bond 
data, they report significant mean abnormal bond returns of –0.878 at the firm 
level and –0.629 at the all-bond level respectively, in the month of the spin-off 
announcement for a sample of 80 spin-offs announced in the period between 1973 
and 1997.  
The results of my study therefore reject the null hypothesis that 
announcements of spin-offs have no effect on bond prices. The average effect is a 
loss in the market value of the existing bonds of the parent firm on the 
announcement of the spin-off. 
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Another important observation is that there exists cross-sectional variation 
in the reaction to the announcement. Nearly 41% (37%) of the firms (of all bonds) 
have a positive response to the announcement. This cross-sectional variation is 
further evident in Table 11 and Table 12. Both tables compare the statistics of the 
firms whose bonds exhibit an average positive response with those of firms whose 
bonds exhibit an average negative response for the two series of monthly 
abnormal returns, which are risk-maturity-adjusted and industry-maturity-adjusted 
respectively. When the sample is subdivided into two groups based on the sign of 
the abnormal returns, it is found that each of the two subgroups has statistically 
significant abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal returns for each subgroup 
for different periods in the six months surrounding the announcement are 
observed to be significant. 
The results of the test of differences in means of the two subgroups tested 
using Welch's approximation of Student t-distribution are also reported. The 
hypothesis that the means of the two subgroups are equal is significantly rejected 
for all the time periods. 
To further investigate the cross-sectional variation in response of the 
outstanding bonds, at the individual bond level, I identify all the nonconvertible 
bonds of the spin-off sample firms that are included in the Lehman data (Fixed 
Income Database) and that were outstanding in the month of announcement. I 
then track each bond until the completion of the spin-off, to determine the number 
of bonds that disappeared between the spin-off announcement and its completion, 
defined as the "spin-off event period." For each bond the return on the risk-
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maturity benchmark index was subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw 
return to calculate the abnormal announcement return. I then calculate average 
abnormal announcement return for the following subsamples: 
1. Sample of the bonds that disappeared between the announcement month and 
the completion (ex-date) of each spin-off. 
2. Paired sample of bonds that remained outstanding for the parent firms of the 
prior subsample. 
3. Sample of all bonds that remained outstanding for the entire sample of parent 
firms. 
I use t-statistics to test for the differences in the mean abnormal 
announcement return between the subsamples of bonds that disappeared and the 
bonds that remained outstanding during the spin-off event period. Table 13 gives 
the results of these tests. These results show that: 
a. The average abnormal return in the month of announcement of all the bonds 
that disappear for the entire sample of parent firms is significantly positive; 
b. The average announcement return of all bonds that did not disappear during 
the spin-off event period for the paired subsample of parent firms is 
significantly negative; and 
c. The subsample of all bonds that remained outstanding for the entire sample of 
parent firms has a significantly negative average abnormal return in the month 
of announcement. 
Two tests are performed to further test whether the abnormal returns for 
bonds that disappear are significantly different from the abnormal return for 
 69 
outstanding bonds. The difference in means was tested for: a) the disappeared and 
outstanding bonds for the entire sample and b) the disappeared bonds and the 
outstanding bonds for the same parent firms, i.e., the paired sample. 
The difference in means of the disappeared bonds and the outstanding 
bonds is found to be significant. The difference in mean abnormal return for the 
sample of disappeared bonds and the paired sample of outstanding bonds for the 
same parent firms is also significant. This implies that for the parent spin-off 
firms, bonds that disappear have significantly positive announcement returns, 
while the outstanding bonds of the same firm have a significantly negative 
average abnormal return. 
The above results suggest that the bonds that disappeared have different 
characteristics than bonds that remain outstanding. One possible difference could 
be the covenant protection. The disappeared bonds could be protected by 
covenants that require that the bonds be redeemed in the event of a restructuring 
such as a spin-off. Though it is largely observed that covenants that directly 
restrict spin-offs are not common (Hite and Owers, 1983), the disappeared bonds 
could have been protected by “event-risk” covenants. As noted by Leland (1991), 
most event-risk covenants have the same broad structure which specifies that 
bondholders can sell their bonds back to the issuer at par if two designated events 
are triggered: (1) a major change in the issuing firm’s capital structure and (2) a 
downgrading of the bond by the rating agencies from investment grade to 
speculate grade. 
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Of the ten bonds that disappeared in the spin-off event period, five bonds 
experience a downgrade in the months around the spin-off announcement for 
which the bonds remain outstanding. Four bonds exhibit no change in rating, 
while one bond has a rating upgrade. 
Thus there is indirect evidence that the bonds that disappeared had better 
covenant protection as compared to bonds that remain outstanding during the 
entire spin-off event period. 
 
5.2.2. Bond ratings and spin-offs 
Bond-rating changes provide additional evidence of reactions in the bond 
markets to spin-off announcements. Since any adjustment of bond rating to reflect 
the expectations of the effects of a spin-off occur with a lag, the changes in the 
bond ratings for firms that are rated by S&P or Moody's is investigated for three 
different periods around the announcement month (i.e., -1 to +1 months, -1 to +6 
months and -1 to +12 months).  The results are reported in Table 14. It is seen that 
five firms experience an increase in ratings, while the bonds for 15 firms are 
downgraded during this period. There is no change in the ratings of 17 firms. The 
analysis at the bond level shows that 12 bonds experience an increase in their 
ratings while the ratings declined for 56 bonds. 
Of the 123 non-convertible bonds that have trader quoted bond data 
available in the month of the spin-off announcement, 46 bonds exhibit positive 
abnormal return in the month of announcement, while 77 bonds exhibit negative 
announcement returns. The ratings of 56 bonds are downgraded, 12 bonds 
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experience an increase in their ratings, and 55 bonds have no change in their 
ratings in the 12 months following the spin-off.  To test whether credit ratings of 
bonds with positive (negative) returns increase (decrease), the sample of spin-off 
bonds is divided into two subsamples: a) bonds with positive announcement 
returns, and b) bonds with negative announcement returns. The bond returns of 
each subsample are regressed on rating changes of the bonds within the 
subsample. The results of the regression show that there is no significant 
relationship between bond returns and rating changes. Similar results are obtained 
by regressing the bond returns for the entire sample on the rating changes. 
Thus, there is no clear relationship between the announcement month 
bond returns and the rating changes of the bonds in the 12 months following the 
announcement. However, the cross-sectional variation in response to spin-offs, 
observed in the bond price reactions, is also evident in the changes in bond 
ratings. Bondholders of firms announcing spin-offs are affected in various ways 
by the restructuring of the firm. While the spin-off has a negative impact on the 
bondholders of some firms, for other firms in the sample the spin-off creates value 
for the bondholders. 
The above observations on the behavior of the parent firms’ bonds around 
the spin-off announcement indicate that the wealth of the existing bondholders of 
the parent firm is affected by the firm’s decision to restructure its business units 
through a spin-off. Whether this effect is positive or negative is determined by 
certain firm-specific factors, which need to be further investigated. 
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5.3. RESULTS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITION SAMPLE 
5.3.1. Bond returns and mergers  
Tables 15 and 16 report the risk-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal 
returns for all bonds and at the  firm level respectively. For all bonds in the month 
of the announcement, the monthly risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal return is 
negative    (-0.0186) though insignificant. However in the two months following 
the announcement, the excess return is significantly negative (-0.0799 and –
0.0795). At the firm-level, the excess bond returns is observed to be negative until 
about six months following the announcement, even though it is not found to be 
significant. In the pre-announcement period, there are eight positive and four 
negative observations of abnormal monthly returns, while in the post-period there 
are eight negative and four positive observations. 
Table 17 gives the cumulative abnormal returns (risk-maturity adjusted) 
for various periods around the spin-off announcement. For the entire sample of 
firms, the CAR is significantly negative (-0.244) for the period -3 to +3 months 
around the merger/acquisition announcement. 
The industry-maturity adjusted monthly abnormal returns are reported for 
all bonds in Table 17 and at the firm level in Table 18. The results are similar to 
the results using the risk-maturity-adjusted benchmark. The cumulative abnormal 
returns (industry-maturity adjusted) for various periods around the spin-off 
announcement are given in Table 19. These are not found to be significant for any 
of the three windows around the announcement month. 
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Fig. 3 displays the distribution of the risk-maturity-adjusted monthly 
abnormal bond returns for all firms and bonds in the matched acquirer sample for 
twelve months around the merger announcement. In comparison to the 
distribution of the average monthly abnormal returns around the spin-off 
announcement, the returns for bondholders around the merger announcement 
exhibit no distinct pattern. 
The insignificant returns to bondholders around the merger/acquisition 
announcement are consistent with the incentive effects of corporate mergers. In 
other words, corporate mergers produce a co- insurance effect and transfer wealth 
from stockholders to bondholders. However, if merging firms are shareholder-
wealth-protecting firms, then they increase their use of leverage relative to the 
pre-merger financial leverage and as a consequence bondholders of merging firms 
do not earn any abnormal returns. This hypothesis of incentive effects is 
examined further in the chapter 8 by examining the change in leverage of the 
acquiring firm and its relationship with bondholder wealth changes. 
Although the average monthly abnormal return is not significant, there 
exists cross-sectional variation in the reaction to the announcement. Nearly 47% 
(49%) of the firms (of all bonds) have a positive response to the announcement. 
Table 21 compares the statistics of the firms whose bonds exhibit an average 
positive response with those of firms whose bonds exhibit an average negative 
response.  When the sample is subdivided into two groups based on the sign of the 
abnormal returns, it is found that each of the two subgroups has statistically 
significant abnormal returns. The subsample of firms whose bonds exhibit a 
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positive response, have abnormal returns ranging from 0.387 on announcement to 
a CAR of 1.764 in the window of 13 months around the announcement. All the 
abnormal returns are significant at the 1% level. For firms whose bonds exhibit a 
negative response, the comparable period abnormal returns range from –0.320 to 
–1.518, all of which are significant at the 1% level. The test of differences in 
means of the two subgroups tested using Welch's approximation of Student t-
distribution significantly rejects the hypothesis in all time periods that the means 
of the two subgroups are equal. 
The cross-sectional variation in the reaction to the announcement 
exhibited by the risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal returns is also observed in the 
industry-maturity-adjusted returns. Table 22 compares the statistics of the firms 
whose bonds exhibit an average positive response with those of firms whose 
bonds exhibit an average negative response.  
5.3.2.  Bond ratings and mergers  
Changes in the bond ratings of the matched acquirer firms are examined 
between three different periods around the announcement month, i.e., -3 to +1 
months, -3 to +6 months and -3 to +12 months.  The results are reported in Table 
22. It is seen that seven firms experience an increase in ratings, while the bonds 
for 14 firms are downgraded during this period. There is no change in the ratings 
of 112 firms. This further supports the observation of cross-sectional variation 
seen in the analysis of bond returns around the merger/acquisition announcement. 
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Chapter 6: Effects of the restructuring on the parent and acquirer 
firms  
6.1. FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS 
To investigate the cross-sectional variation in the reaction in the bond 
markets to the restructuring announcement s, the changes that the restructurings 
(spin-offs or mergers or acquisitions) bring about in the parent  or acquirer firms 
are examined. The following firm-level characteristics could potentially be 
changed because of a restructuring: 
Capital structure: Since the debt of the original firm is divided between the parent 
and the new entity formed as a result of the spin-off, the leverage of the parent 
could change as a result of the spin-off. In a merger or acquisition, the debt of the 
acquiring firm might increase or decrease from its pre-merger levels. Any change 
in the leverage of the acquiring firm will affect its outstanding debtholders. 
Operational efficiency: Removal of negative synergies between the parent and the 
spun-off subsidiary as a result of the spin-off could lead to improved operating 
performance of the parent. The spin-off could also allow managers to focus better 
on the lines of business left with the parent firm, thereby resulting in an 
improvement in the parent firm’s performance. Synergies created by the merger 
or acquisition would also improve operating performance for the acquirer and 
target firms involved. Operating efficiencies are believed by many prior 
researchers to be the prime driver behind value creation in intra-industry or non-
conglomerate mergers. It follows therefore that the acquirer firms in non-
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conglomerate mergers might have improved operating performance as a result of 
the merger. 
Business risks: The cash flows of the original firm are a sum total of its earnings 
from the business lines of the parent and its subsidiaries. The spin-off separates 
the business lines of the parent and the subsidiary, thereby possibly changing the 
variability of the cash flows of the parent firm. Similarly, in a merger or 
acquisition two different entities in different lines of business could be brought 
together in a conglomerate merger. While in a nonconglomerate merger the new 
combined entity could have a greater dependency on a single industry. Either of 
these situations would change the business risks, thereby changing the variability 
of the cash flows of the acquirer firm. 
 
6.2. SPIN-OFF PARENT FIRMS  
The sample of parent spin-off and target firms is further screened for the 
availability of Compustat data for a two-year window around the year of the spin-
off. Parent-subsidiary firm pairs that have Compustat data as well as bond returns 
in the month of announcement are used in the further analysis. Changes in the 
above- listed characteristics of the parent firm are examined for the 37 firms for 
which bond returns and Compustat data are available. Table 22 provides summary 
statistics of the descriptive variables that characterize the parent firms (Panel A) 
and their corresponding subsidiary firms (Panel B) used in the sample. 
Size is measured in terms of the assets of the firm. The median firm pre-
spin-off has assets of $9.3 billion and then spins off a $1.5 billion subsidiary. 
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Thus, the median firm spins off approximately 16% of its assets. There is a 
significant decrease in the average size of the parent firms post spin-off, while the 
sizes of the subsidiaries increase significantly post-spin-off. The mean size of the 
subsidiaries relative to the parent firms increase significantly from 22% pre-spin-
off to 29% post-spin-off. Subsidiary firms are therefore allocated a greater share 
of the assets in the spin-off. 
To test for changes in leverage, book- as well as market- leverage ratios are 
calculated. Book-leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt and current 
liabilities to book value of assets. Market- leverage is defined as the ratio of long- 
term debt and current liabilities to the sum of the market value of equity and book 
value of debt. The mean book- leverage ratio of the parent firms decreases from 
34% in the pre-spin-off period to 33% post spin-off. For the subsidiaries, the 
mean-book leverage ratio increases from 29% to 35%. In the light of the earlier 
observation that the asset base of the subsidiaries increases significantly post-
spin-off, the increase in their book leverage would be brought about by an 
increase in the debt allocated to the subsidiaries in the spin-off. The average debt 
of the subsidiaries increases by $1.62 billion, while correspondingly the parent 
firms exhibit a statistically significant average decrease in their total debt by $2.3 
billion. 
The mean market- leverage ratio of the parent firms decreases from 39% 
pre-spin-off to 34% post-spin-off, the change being statistically significant. There 
is also a decrease in the market- leverage ratios of the subsidiaries. Figs. 4 and 5 
display the change in capital structure and asset characteristics of the parent firm. 
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Change in operational efficiency is measured as the difference in the pre- 
and post-spin-off industry adjusted return on assets (ROA). ROA is calculated as 
ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes to market value of assets 
and is adjusted for industry performance by subtracting the median ratio for all 
firms in the Compustat file with the same four-digit SIC code. The average parent 
firm exhibits a 2% decrease in the industry-adjusted return on assets in the year 
following the spin-off. 
Total firm returns are not observable; therefore their returns' variances and 
covariances cannot be calculated directly. I use two surrogates for firm returns' 
variances to test for the impact of changes in business risks of the parent firm in 
the bond markets. These include changes in stock returns' variance and changes in 
ratings of the outstanding bonds of the parent firms. The methodology described 
in Cox and Rubinstein (1985) and Ohlson and Penman (1985) is used to calculate 
stock returns' variances using daily stock price data for the two six-month periods 
(-190 to -11 and +11 to +190 days) before and after the spin-off announcement. 
Of the 37 firms, nearly 51% (19 firms) exhibit an increase in the variance of their 
stock returns. The outstanding bonds of the parent firms are examined for any 
change in their ratings by S&P or Moody's in the period one-month prior to the 
spin-off announcement to one-year subsequent to the announcement. The ratings 
of the bonds of 15 parent firms  (41%) decreases, while for 22 firms there is either 
an increase or no change in rating. 
Change in focus of the parent firms is also measured. Following Desai and 
Jain (1999) a focus- increasing spin-off is defined as one when the two-digit SIC 
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code of the parent is different from the two-digit SIC code of the subsidiary. A 
similar classification using the two-digit SIC code is used by Walker (1994) and 
Scanlon, Trifts and Pettway (1989) in their studies of takeovers and acquisitions. 
Of the 37 parent firms in my sample, 20 firms exhibit an increase in focus as a 
result of the spin-off. 
Motivated by the findings in Stark et al. (1994), a post-Marriott variable is 
used as a dummy variable to proxy for whether the spin-off occurred after the 
Marriott spin-off that had led to heightened bondholder activism. This checks for 
any temporal shifts in the bond market reactions to spin-offs following the 
Marriott spin-off. 
 
6.3. ACQUIRER FIRMS  
The firm-level characteristics of the acquirer firms are examined for any 
changes in capital structure, operating efficiencies and business risks. Compustat 
data and month 0 bond returns are available for 50 matched-acquirer target- firm 
pairs. Table 24 provides summary statistics of the sample. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the matched acquirer firms. Panel B describes the 
characteristics of the corresponding target firms. 
The mean pre-merger size of the acquirer firm is $34.37 billion, while the 
mean target firm has a pre-merger size of  $13.49 billion. There is a significant  
post-merger increase in average size of the acquirer and target firms. Figs. 6 and 7 
display the change in capital structure and asset characteristics of the matched 
acquirer firms. 
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Change in leverage is tested using book as well as market leverage ratios. 
The mean book- leverage ratio of the acquirer firms increases significantly from 
24% in the pre-merger period to 26% post-merger. For the target firms, the mean 
book-leverage ratio increases significantly from 26% to 34%. The change in the 
mean market- leverage ratios of the acquirer firms as well as the target firms is not 
significant. The average debt of the acquirer increases significantly by $4.13 
billion, while correspondingly the target firms experience a statistically significant 
average increase in their total debt by $3.65 billion. Since the debt of both the 
acquirer and the target firms increases significantly post merger, it indicates that 
firms increase their debt after a merger. The book- leverage increases significantly, 
while the increase in market leverage is insignificant. The insignificance of the 
increase in the market leverage could be driven by an increase in the equity values 
of the firms post-merger. Thus the observation seems to support the claim that 
mergers result in firms increasing their debt capacity. 
Change in operational efficiency, as measured as the difference in the pre- 
and post-spin-off industry adjusted return on assets (ROA),  of  the average 
acquirer firm shows a significant 3.4% decrease in the year following the merger. 
Change in S&P or Moody’s ratings of the outstanding bonds of the 
acquirer firms is used as a proxy for changes in business risk. Rating changes are 
examined in the period one-month prior to the merger/acquisition announcement 
to one year subsequent to the announcement. The ratings of the bonds of six 
parent firms (12%) decreases. Two (4%) firms experience an increase in their 
ratings. The rating of 42 firms (84%) remains unchanged. 
 81 
A variable defined as “Conglomerate” is used to study any differences in 
wealth effects across conglomerate and nonconglomerate mergers. Following 
Maquieira et al. (1998), a conglomerate merger is defined as one where the 
acquirer and the target firms have different two-digit SIC codes. For example, if 
the merging firms have the same primary line of business, the merger is classified 
as nonconglomerate and if the two firms have different primary lines the merger 
is classified as conglomerate. A similar classification using the two-digit SIC code 
is used by Walker (1994) and Scanlon, Trifts, and Pettway (1989) in their studies 
of takeovers and acquisitions. Of the 50 mergers studied, 44 mergers are classified 
as nonconglomerate while six are classified as conglomerate. Although there is no 
agreement on the definition of conglomerate versus nonconglomerate mergers, 
this classification is justifiable and a very similar technique (matching by two-
digit SIC codes from CRSP) has been employed by other researchers, including 
Berger and Ofek (1995), Sicherman and Pettway (1987) and Smith (1990). 
Moreover, Megginson et al. (1997) show that over 85% of the post-1977 mergers 
in their sample that are classified as conglomerate (focus-decreasing) or non-
conglomerate (focus-preserving or focus- increasing) using the SIC code/line of 
business screen would have been classified the same way using the more 
sophisticated revenue-based Herfindahl measure.  
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Chapter 7: Testing the relationship between bondholder wealth 
effects and changes in firm characteristics 
7.1. PREDICTIONS      
The theoretical model predicts that changes in each of these parent firm 
characteristics could influence the wealth effects of spin-offs on bondholders.  
The primary implications of the theoretical model are: 
HI: Leverage effect. If the leverage of the parent increases post spin-off, then 
bondholders would be expected to face a loss in wealth. The incentive effect 
hypothesis predicts that stockholders will try to negate any positive wealth 
transfers to the bondholders as a result of the merger by increasing leverage. An 
increase in leverage may not be possible for some companies, however, because 
of prior covenants. In any case, if markets are informationally efficient a 
bondholder should be able to anticipate any future debt ratio changes and assess 
the effects on their bonds. Therefore, bondholder gains should be inversely related 
to post-merger leverage increase. On the other hand, if there is no incentive effect, 
one would expect to see the greatest gain for bondholders where the decrease in 
risk is the greatest (i.e., for more highly levered firms). 
HII: Operational efficiency effect. If the operational efficiency of the parent firm 
improves because of the spin-off, then any potential bondholder losses would be 
mitigated or possibly even turned into gains. The synergy effect predicts that 
bondholders may some of the synergy with shareholders if synergy gains exist in 
a merger or acquisition. 
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HIII: Variance effect. Post spin-off the variance of the parent firm's rate of return 
could increase. Then, as the writers of a put option, the bondholders would be 
expected to experience a decline in the value of their claims. 
The incentive effect could involve either post-merger increases in 
operating risk or post-merger increases in leverage. Therefore an increase in the 
post-merger variance should be inversely related to bondholder gains. 
7.1.1. Correlations  
To determine the relationships between bondholder wealth and the firm-
level characteristics, the Pearson correlations between bondholder returns and the 
firm variables are analyzed. Table 26 presents the correlation matrix between the 
bondholder wealth change and change in parent firm characteristics due to a spin-
off. Many variables show significant relationships. Change in bondholder wealth 
is found to be significantly related to pre-spin-off leverage of parent firms. The 
relationship between bondholder wealth and change in market leverage of the 
parent firm is significantly negative.  Change in bondholder wealth is also found 
to be significantly related to the post-Marriott dummy variable. Though the 
correlations between change in bondholder wealth and change in ROA and 
change in rating are not significant, the direction of the relationships is as 
predicted. Interestingly, the interaction effect of change in parent firms' operating 
efficiency and change in variance is significantly negatively correlated to change 
in bondholder wealth. 
The correlations between bondholder wealth changes and changes in firm 
characteristics for the matched-acquirer firms sample are also ana lyzed. Change 
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in bondholder wealth is found to be significantly related to variance as measured 
by rating changes, change in book leverage, change in ROA (both industry-
adjusted and raw measures), post-merger market leverage, change in market 
leverage  of the acquirer firm. The target firm’s pre-merger debt, pre-merger 
market value, pre-merger market leverage, pre-merger size, change in (industry-
adjusted and raw) ROA, change in interest coverage of target, ratio of acquirer to 
target post-merger book leverage, change in the ratio of target to acquire size and 
the conglomerate variable show significant correlation to change in bondholder 
wealth. Table 27 enumerates the coefficient correlations and their significance.  
7.1.2.  Individual component effects 
Since the three components of changes in parent firm characteristics do 
not necessarily act in the same direction, the change in value of any security is 
determined by the relative magnitudes of each effect. Initially each one is 
considered separately, and individual models are tested to isolate the effect of 
each independent component on bondholder wealth. 
The leverage effect is tested by the following model: 
MODEL 1: EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE  
Index-adjusted returns of the      =  a1 +b1 (Change in leverage of  
parent firm bonds in the                                 parent firm)  
month of announcement 
The expected sign of b1 is negative for the parent spin-off firm sample as well as 
for the matched-acquirer firms. Pre-spin-off market leverage of parent, Post-spin-
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off leverage of the parent to the leverage of the subsidiary ratio and relative size 
of subsidiary to the parent are used as control variables in Model 1. 
The operational efficiency effect is tested by the model: 
MODEL 2: EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY  
Index-adjusted returns of the      =  a2 +b2 (Change in operational  
parent firm bonds in the                                 efficiency of parent firm)  
month of announcement  
Improvements in operational efficiency of the parent /acquirer firm should not 
affect the parent firm's bondholders adversely, even though the bondholders might 
not gain significantly from improved operational efficiency of the firm. From the 
bondholders' viewpoint, any increase in ROA improves the ability of the firm to 
make the promised payments (interest and principal value of debt) to the 
bondholders. b2 is therefore expected to be found either not significant or 
significantly positive. Post-spin-off relative size of the subsidiary to the parent is 
used as a control variable. Prior researchers (Desai and Jain, 1999) show that the 
post-spin-off performance of focus- increasing spin-offs is significantly different 
than the non-focus- increasing sample. Change in focus is therefore used as a 
moderating variable in testing Model 2. 
To test the variance effect, the following model is employed: 
MODEL 3: EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN RISK  
Index-adjusted returns of the      =    a3 +b3  (Change in variance  
parent firm bonds in the                                 of the parent firm's rate of return)  
month of announcement 
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The expected sign of? b3 is negative. Post-Marriott dummy is used as a control 
variable to check for any temporal shifts for the spin-off sample. 
 
7.2. REGRESSION RESULTS 
7.2.1. Spin-off sample 
Tables 28, 29, 30 present the results of the individual regression analyses. 
Change in bondholder wealth is significantly negatively related to the change in 
leverage of the parent firm. The coefficient value implies that bondholders on 
average lose an additional 27 percentage points if the market leverage of the 
parent firm increases as a result of the spin-off. 
The relationship between bondholder returns and change in operational 
efficiency of the parent firm is significantly positive when the interaction between 
change in operational efficiency and change in focus is included in Model 2.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on the Focus variable has a negative sign.  
Furthermore, the interaction variable Focus*ROA of parent is significantly and 
negatively related to bondholder returns. Section 7.3.1 discusses the implication 
of this result. 
Change in risk of parent does not have a significant effect on bondholder 
returns. However, the sign of the coefficient is as predicted under hypothesis III. 
To examine changes in abnormal bond returns over time, I partition the 
spin-off sample in a number of ways and examine the relationship between the 
abnormal bond returns and the corresponding dummies for temporal shifts. The 
Marriott spin-off was announced in October 1992 and completed in October 1993. 
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The final sample consists of spin-offs announced and completed between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. To study changes in bond market reactions to spin-offs over time 
that may or may not be attributed to the heightened bondholder activism 
following the Marriott spin-off, I partition the spin-off sample in the following 
ways: 
1. Spin-offs announced before October 1993 and spin-offs announced after 
October 1993 (including any announcements in October 1993); 
2. Spin-offs announced before 1988, between 1989 and September 1993, and 
after October 1993; 
3. Spin-offs announced between 1979 to 1990, between 1991 and 1995, and after 
January 1996 (including January 1996); and 
4. Spin-offs announced before October 1993, between November 1993 and 
1995, and after January 1996. 
The relationship between the bond returns and the time-period dummies is 
examined separately for each partitioning of the sample. The results of the four 
regressions are given in Table 31. These results show that the relationship 
between bond returns and the temporal dummy is significant only when the 
sample is partitioned around the Marriott spin-off (i.e. when there is a dummy for 
after the announcement of the Marriott spin-off in October 1993). This indicates 
that following the Marriott spin-off there was a systemic change in reactions in 
the bond markets to announcement of spin-offs. The significant negative 
coefficient suggests that bondho lders became more aware of the event risk that a 
spin-off can manifest. A restructuring through spin-off could potentially weaken 
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the claims of the parent firm’s bondholders on the underlying assets of the 
original firm and thereby decrease bondholder wealth. This heightened 
bondholder awareness is one potential reason why bond market reactions to a 
spin-off are significantly negative (specifically for the spin-offs announced 
following the Marriott spin-off). 
7.2.2.  Matched-acquirer firms sample 
Tables 32, 33, 34 present the results of the individual regression analysis. 
Change in bondholder wealth is significantly negatively related to change in 
leverage of the acquirer firm. The coefficient value implies that bondholders on 
an average lose an additional 25 percentage points if the post-merger market- 
(book-) leverage of the acquirer firm increases. 
The relationship between bondholder returns and change in operational 
efficiency of the acquirer firm is significantly positive. The Conglomerate 
variable has a significant negative effect on bondholder wealth. These results 
imply that bondholders can gain more in non-conglomerate mergers than in 
conglomerate mergers. 
Change in risk of parent has a significant negative effect on bondholder 
returns. If the credit rating of the acquirer firm decreases because of the merger 
announcement, the bondholder wealth decreases. 
 
7.3. FULL-EFFECTS REGRESSION   
The individual wealth effects are modulated by the presence or absence of 
one or more of the firm-level changes. Therefore, to test for interaction effects 
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among the various variables a full-effects regression model is tested which 
includes all the independent variables. Moreover, tests for incentive effects 
requires the joint test of the hypothesis that there is a coinsurance effect and that 
shareholder wealth-protecting firms tend to neutralize the alleged wealth transfer 
by increasing leverage after the restructuring. This joint hypothesis is tested as 
follows: 
Index-adjusted returns of     =      a4 +b1 (Changes in leverage of parent) + 
parent firm bonds in the               b2 (Changes in operational efficiency of 
month of announcement               parent) + b3 (Changes in variance of rate of 
                                                      return of parent) + b4 (pre-spin-off parent 
                                                      leverage) + b5 (Focus dummy) + b6(post-  
                                                      spin-off relative size of subsidiary to parent) + 
                                                      b7 (post-spin-off relative leverage of subsidiary  
                                                      to  parent) + b8 (post-Marriott dummy). 
As in the individual components effects, the post-Marriott dummy is used to 
detect any time shift in the spin-off sample only. 
7.3.1.  Spin-off sample 
Table 35 presents the results of the tests of the full-effects model. 
Bondholder returns are significantly related to the pre-spin-off leverage of the 
parent. The coefficient implies that ho lding all other factors constant, if the parent 
firm has a higher leverage pre-spin-off, then its bondholders lose 27% more than 
bondholders of parent firms having low market leverage. The coefficient on 
change in leverage of parent firm is negative and significant. This supports the 
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model's implications that if the parent firm leverage increases post-spin-off then 
its bondholders lose wealth. 
The coefficient on change in return on assets is significantly positive. This 
provides evidence that bondholders ga in in spin-offs in which the operating 
efficiency of the parent firm improves post-spin-off. Increase in focus of the 
parent is has an insignificant effect on bondholder wealth. However the 
coefficient on the interaction between increase in focus and change in return on 
assets of the parent is significantly negative. This indicates that gains to 
bondholder as a result of post-spin-off improvement in efficiency of the parent 
decrease if the focus of the parent improves as a result of the spin-off. One 
possib le explanation for this significant effect is that focus- increasing spin-offs 
lead to improvement in operating performance of the parent. Yet, increased focus 
also tends to eliminate the coinsurance effect for corporate debt (Lewellen, 1971). 
Parent firms that have subsidiaries in unrelated lines of business lose the 
coinsurance effect when they separate their earnings streams from that of the 
subsidiary in a focus- increasing spin-off.  The implication for the existing 
bondholders of the parent firm is that the risk of default increases, even though 
the economic efficiency of the parent firm improves in focus- increasing spin-offs. 
Change in rating of parent firm is found to have no significant effect on 
bondholder wealth. 
As is evident from the significant negative coefficient on the post-Marriott 
dummy, a temporal shift is noted in the reactions of bond market to 
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announcement of spin-offs. Bond returns are significantly negative for spin-offs 
following the Marriott spin-off. 
7.3.2. Matched-acquirer firms sample 
The full-effects model for the matched-acquirer firms is presented in Table 
36. Bondholder returns are significantly related to the change in variance of the 
acquirer’s rate of return. The coefficient implies that holding all other factors 
constant, a merger in which the acquirer firm rating decreases would lead to a 
23% loss in wealth for the bondholders.  
Interestingly, the effect of a change in the leverage of the acquirer firm, 
though significant in the analysis of the individual effects, is not significant in the 
full-effects model. The bondholder wealth effects are driven by the change in the 
business risks of the acquirer rather than by changes in leverage of the acquirer. 
This lends support to the “no incentive effects” hypothesis. There is a higher 
likelihood that the business risk of the acquirer firm would change in a 
conglomerate merger than in a non-conglomerate merger. Since the Conglomerate 
variable has a significant negative effect on bondholder wealth, I find additional 
support to the observation that changes in bondholder wealth are more a result of 
the changes in the business risk of the acquirer than incentive effects. 
The coefficient on change in industry-adjusted return on assets is 
significantly positive. This provides evidence that bondholders share in the gains 
resulting from improvements in operating efficiency along with the shareholders. 
The significance of the Conglomerate variable in the individual effects model that 
analyzes the effect of changes in operating efficiency (Model 2) implies that 
 92 
improvements in operating efficiency differ across the type of merger. A 
nonconglomerate merger exhibits a greater improvement in operating 
performance of the acquirer firm.  The implication for the holders of the  
outstanding bonds of the  acquirer firm is that they could expect more gains in 
nonconglomerate merger than in a conglomerate merger. The significant positive 
coefficient on the change in industry-adjusted ROA of the target firms implies 
that existing bondholders of acquirer firms share in the synergy resulting from the 
merger that leads to better overall operating performance. 
 
7.4. COMPARING THE TWO TYPES OF RESTRUCTURINGS  
Spin-offs and merger and acquisitions are two types of restructurings that 
can be considered as mirror images. In a spin-off, a company divides itself into 
two publicly traded segments. In a merger or an acquisition, two publicly traded 
firms combine to form a single public entity. Schall, 1972 shows that for the 
multiperiod case (with risky as well as riskless debt), with transaction costless 
capital markets, the value of any set of income streams received by investors 
(after corporate taxes) is the same regardless of how that set of streams is 
provided. That is, the total value of a set of streams to investors is the same 
regardless of how that set is combined or divided into the debt or equity of one or 
more firms. This proposition is known as the Value Additivity Principle (VAP). 
Value additivity implies that the value of two cash flows will be the sum of the 
values of the separate flows. Empirically, value additivity conflicts with the 
wealth-creating effects of corporate spin-offs and mergers or acquisitions.  The 
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results of this study provide evidence that bondholder wealth effects are 
determined by different value drivers depending on the type of restructuring. 
While the leverage effect is the predominant determinant of bondholder wealth in 
spin-offs, change in business risks primarily influences the effect of mergers on 
bondholder wealth. 
The effect of focus on bondholder wealth is quite similar across the two 
types of restructurings. Focus-increasing spin-offs lead to improvement in 
operating performance of the parent. However, increased focus also tends to 
eliminate the co- insurance effect for corporate debt. The implication for the 
existing bondholders of the parent firm is that the risk of default increases even 
though the economic efficiency of the parent firm improves in focus- increasing 
spin-offs. 
In the case of mergers, focus-preserving mergers (i.e. nonconglomerate 
mergers) exhibit a greater improvement in operating performance of the acquirer 
firm as compared to conglomerate mergers. The implication for the holders of the 
outstanding bonds of the acquirer firm is that they could expect more gains in 
nonconglomerate merger than in a conglomerate merger. 
7.5. COMPARING THE RESULTS WITH THE RESULTS OF A RECENT STUDY OF 
BONDHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF SPIN-OFFS  
As noted in section 3.3.2, the Maxwell and Rao (2002) study is one of the 
more recent studies to test the wealth expropriation hypothesis that claims 
stockholder gains on the announcement of a spin-off are due to a wealth transfer 
from bondholders to stockholders. There are some similarities between the 
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Maxwell and Rao paper and my dissertation. However, each study has its own 
distinct focus. The focus of my dissertation is to understand the wealth effects of 
spin-offs on bondholders in a broad framework, considering not just wealth-
transfer effects but also wealth creation effects of spin-offs for bondholders. 
Besides spin-offs, I study wealth effects of bondholders in mergers and 
acquisition. Here, I develop a good understanding of the common determinants of 
bondholder wealth across the two types of transactions and identify any 
transaction-specific effects. The Maxwell and Rao paper focuses on examining a 
wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders in a spin-off. 
Similar to my analysis, Maxwell and Rao (2000) measure wealth effects of 
spin-offs announcement on bondholders, by measuring changes in bond returns in 
the month of announcement and also examining changes in ratings of outstanding 
bonds. They find that bondholders, on the average, have a statistically significant 
negative abnormal return of 0.88% during the month of the spin-off 
announcement. This is similar to the significant negative abnormal return of 
0.25% observed in the announcement month for the outstanding nonconvertible 
bonds of parent spin-off firms in my sample. 
The spin-off sample period in the Maxwell and Rao (2000) paper (i.e., 
1976 to 1997) is very close to my sample period of 1979 to April 30, 1998. Both 
studies exclude spin-offs that are not completed (Maxwell and Rao, 2002, p.9). 
The average time between the announcement and the ex-dividend dates for my 
spin-off sample is six months, similar to the 5.63 months observed for the same 
event period by Maxwell and Rao. The final sample used by Maxwell and Rao 
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includes 80 firms having 311 individual bond issues. My final spin-off sample, 
after screening for firms having consecutive time series of exclusively trader-
quoted returns in the month of announcement and for six months following the 
announcement, includes 37 parent firms having 123 nonconvertible bonds. 
Both papers use the Fixed Income Database that provides institutional 
bond prices from major over-the-counter bond dealers, as well as return and 
ratings data for corporate bonds (collected by Lehman Brothers). I examine bond 
returns and rating changes of publicly traded nonconvertible debt of the parent 
firm that is outstanding at the time of the announcement. Maxwell and Rao 
(2000), however, examine all publicly traded debt of the spin-off firms, without 
any distinction between convertible and nonconvertible bonds. The results of Hite 
and Owers (1983) show that the reactions of convertible and nonconvertible debt 
differ. In their sample, the mean cumulative prediction error for straight bonds is 
0.002 (test-statistic is 0.13); while for convertible bonds it is 0.034 (test-statistic is 
6.18). Only the convertible bond returns are statistically significant. They 
examine the possibility that the option component of the convertible debt is the 
likely explanation for this result. They find that seven of 17 convertible issues in 
their sample could have been converted to common stock worth at least 90% of 
the value of the bond on day –2. On the average these bond issues gained 0.067 at 
the announcement and the corresponding common stock gained 0.081. Thus the 
convertible issues near the money accounted for most of the positive effect. In the 
light of these results, it is useful to examine convertible and nonconvertible debt 
separately to understand the wealth effects. 
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The Fixed Income Database provides trader-quotes for bonds when 
available or matrix prices. As demonstrated by Warga and Welch (1993), trader-
quoted prices are more likely to reflect all available information than are matrix 
prices. Therefore the analysis in my study uses only trader-quoted prices. 
Moreover, Sarig and Warga (1989) show that as the liquidity of a bond decreases, 
the quality of the recorded prices deteriorates. They suggest that users of bond 
data can employ some heuristic filters to screen out questionable observations. 
Following their recommendations, I use a filter to eliminate bonds that do not 
have a consecutive time series of exclusively trader-quoted returns around the 
announcement period. This ensures that all bonds in the sample are highly liquid 
and the market response to the spin-off announcement is fully reflected in the 
bond prices. Maxwell and Rao (2002) do not seem to make any distinction 
between trader-quotes and matrix prices. 
Maxwell and Rao (2002) examine bond price reactions only in the spin-off 
announcement month. My study tracks the bonds outstanding at the time of 
announcement, for 12 months before and 12 months after announcement, to 
examine any leaks of information or lagged reactions in the bond markets. 
Considering the infrequent trading and illiquidity in the bond markets, it helps to 
examine bond price changes over a period of time. 
The above differences in sampling procedure explain the differences in the 
final sample of spin-off firms and bonds across the two studies. Besides 
examining the reactions in bond markets, both papers test for determinants of 
bondholder wealth in spin-offs. I find the leverage effect (i.e., change in leverage  
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of the parent firm post-spin-off) is the predominant determinant of bondholder 
wealth in spin-offs. I also find that bondholder returns are significantly related to 
the pre-spin-off leverage of the parent. The coefficient implies that, holding all 
other factors constant, if the parent firm has a higher leverage pre-spin-off then its 
bondholders lose 27% more than bondholders of parent firms having low market 
leverage. Consistent with this finding, Maxwell and Rao (2002) find that 
bondholder losses (stockholder gains) are significantly influenced by financial 
risk. They use high pre-spin-off leverage ratios of debt-to-equity and debt-to-
market value of equity, and alternatively by low pre-spin-off bond ratings (non-
investment grade) as measures of the degree of financial risk. 
Maxwell and Rao (2002) do not find any difference in the returns to 
bondholders based on whether the spin-off is cross- industry versus same-industry, 
and therefore do not support the hypothesis that the loss of coinsurance effect to 
bondholders in a cross- industry spin-off could yield potentially higher wealth 
transfer effects to shareholders compared to same-industry spin-offs. This is 
similar to my finding that increase in focus of the parent has an insignificant 
effect on bondholder wealth. However, a further examination of the interaction 
between focus and change in operational efficiency reveals an interesting result. I 
find that the coefficient on the interaction between increase in focus and change in 
return on assets of the parent is significantly negative. This indicates that gains to 
bondholder as a result of post-spin-off improvement in efficiency of the parent 
decrease if the focus of the parent improves as a result of the spin-off. One 
possible explanation for this significant effect is that focus- increasing spin-offs 
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lead to improvement in operating performance of the parent. However increased 
focus also tends to eliminate the co-insurance effect for corporate debt. Parent 
firms that have subsidiaries in unrelated lines of business lose the co-insurance 
effect when they separate their earnings streams from that of the subsidiary in a 
focus-increasing spin-off. The implication for the existing bondholders of the 
parent firm is that the risk of default increases, even though the economic 
efficiency of the parent firm improves in focus- increasing spin-offs. 
Maxwell and Rao (2002) also find loss of collateral to be another factor 
that influences bondholder returns. Loss of collateral is measured by size of the 
assets in the spin-off entity relative to the pre-spin-off firm. I examine the 
relationship between the relative size of the subsidiary to the parent post-spin-off 
and bondholder returns. I find the relationship to be nega tive though not 
significant. 
The change in rating of the outstanding bonds is examined by both studies.  
Both studies show that there are more downgrades than upgrades in time periods 
of six to twelve months following the spin-offs. I find that change in rating of 
parent firm does not have a significant effect on bondholder wealth. However, the 
variable measuring the interaction effect of change in rating and change in 
operational efficiency of the parent firm is significantly related to bondholder 
returns. I interpret the significant negative coefficient of this interaction term to 
imply that the direct relationship between a decrease in rating (increase in risk) of 
a parent firm and a decrease in bondholder wealth weakens as operating 
performance increases. 
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Besides the above factors considered by Maxwell and Rao (2002), I 
analyze the effects on bondholder wealth of changes in operational efficiency and 
business risks of the parent firm as a result of the spin-off. The relationship 
between bondholder returns and change in operational efficiency of the parent 
firm is significantly positive. I find that change in business risk of parent (as 
measured by changes in stock returns' variance and changes in ratings of the 
outstanding bonds of the parent) does not have a significant effect on bondholder 
returns. Yet, the sign of the coefficient is as predicted. The interaction effect of 
change in operational efficiency and change in risk of the parent firm has a 
significant negative effect on bondholder returns. 
Thus my dissertation and the Maxwell and Rao (2002) paper, both 
contribute significantly in understanding the wealth effects of spin-offs on 
bondholders of the parent firm.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and extensions 
This study investigates the effects of restructur ings through spin-offs as 
well as mergers and acquisitions on the firm and its debtholders.  Changes in the 
firm characteristics including capital structure, business risks, and operating 
performance of the firm are analyzed. This dissertation develops a model that 
predicts the relationship between cross-sectional firm characteristics and the 
changes in wealth of the original bondholders of the acquirer/parent firms that 
have publicly traded outstanding nonconvertible debt at the time of the 
merger/acquisition and spin-off respectively.  The model predicts three important 
wealth effects: leverage effect, operational efficiency effect, and variance effect. 
The empirical analyses show the wealth effects of corporate restructurings 
through mergers and acquisitions as well as spin-offs on bondholders. Using 
trader quotes for the sample of parent spin-off firms and the matched-acquirer 
firms that have publicly traded nonconvertible debt, monthly bond returns are 
calculated in the announcement period. Risk-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal 
returns are significantly negative in the month of the announcement both at the all 
bond level and at the firm level for the spin-off sample. For the matched acquirer 
firm sample, though the bond returns are insignificant in the month of the 
announcement, significant negative returns are observed in the three months 
before to two months following the merger.  Moreover, there exists a sufficient 
cross-sectional variation in the reaction to the announcement in the samples for 
both types of restructurings. 
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To explain the cross-sectional variation in the reaction in the bond markets 
to the spin-off announcement, I examine changes in the parent and acquirer firm 
characteristics that result from the restructurings. This study finds evidence that 
restructurings affect both parent and acquirer firm characteristics. There is a 
significant change in total debt, size, and leverage. In spin-offs, the parent firms’ 
size, total debt, and leverage significantly decrease. In mergers or acquisitions, the 
acquirer firm’s size, total debt, and leverage exhibit a significant increase. 
Operating performance, as measured by the industry-adjusted ROA, of the 
matched-acquirer firms has a significant decrease in the year following the merger 
announcement. Regression models are tested to establish the relationship between 
changes in parent firm characteristics and bondholder returns. The evidence is 
supportive of the model's implications that if the parent firm’s leverage increases 
post-spin-off, then its bondholders lose wealth. The operational efficiency effect 
is also significant. In particular, spin-offs that lead to improved performance of 
the parent firm exhibit positive announcement-period excess returns. Surprisingly, 
gains to bondholder as a result of post-spin-off improvement in efficiency of the 
parent decrease if the focus of the parent improves as a result of the  spin-off. This 
is consistent with the view that for bondholders, elimination of the coinsurance 
effect dominates over any efficiency gains in focus-increasing spin-offs. 
With respect to mergers and acquisitions, change in variance and change 
in operating efficiency of the acquirer (as well as the target firms) affect 
bondholder returns. The bondholder wealth effects are driven more by the change 
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in the business risks of the acquirer rather than by changes in leverage of the 
acquirer. 
Though not the primary objective of this study, it also examines whether 
transactions that increase corporate focus create more value than transactions that 
decrease focus. It is found that the direct relationship between focus and 
bondholder wealth depends on the type of the transaction. In the case of spin-off, 
there is no significant direct relation. However, increased focus tends to modulate 
the effect of the change in variance as well as the change in operating efficiency 
of the parent. Though the economic efficiency of the parent firm improves in 
focus-increasing spin-offs, the risk of default also increases possibly due to the 
elimination of the co- insurance effect because of the separation of the cash flows 
of the parent from that of its subsidiary. 
With respect to mergers and acquisitions, a focus- increasing or a focus-
preserving merger (i.e., a nonconglomerate merger) exhibits a greater 
improvement in operating performance of the acquirer firm. The implication for 
the holders of the outstanding bonds of the acquirer firm is that they could expect 
more gains in nonconglomerate merger than in a conglomerate merger. The 
significant positive coefficient on the change in industry-adjusted ROA of the 
target firms implies that existing bondholders of acquirer firms share in the 
synergy resulting from the merger that leads to better overall operating 
performance. 
It is clear that along with stockholders, bondholders are also affected when 
corporations choose to restructure their assets, business units, and capital 
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structures. The nature of restructuring determines the gains or losses that 
bondholders could anticipate as a result of the firm-level changes. This study 
contributes towards understanding the risks and benefits involved in investing in 
the debt of corporations. 
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Table 1  
Sample characteristics of completed spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions by 
announcement date and ex-date. 
This table reports the distribution by year of announcement and year of completion of the full 
sample of spin-offs and mergers/acquisitions announced and completed between 1979 and 
April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes , the Security Data Company's 
(SDC) Worldwide Acquisition  database, publications such as Moody's Dividend Records, 
Mergers and Acquisitions , and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street 
Journal. Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. For the spin-offs sample, the average time between announcement and ex-date is 
six months. The corresponding period for the mergers and acquisition sample is four months. 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF COMPLETED SPIN-OFFS 
NUMBER OF COMPLETED 
MERGERS/ACQUISITIONS BY U.S. 
FIRMS 
  
BY ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
BY EX-DATE 
 
BY ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
BY EX-
DATE 
     
1979 10  13 10 
1980 9 15 40 9 
1981 10 11 192 157 
1982 11 11 194 191 
1983 17 11 339 287 
1984 13 17 485 459 
1985 19 15 432 432 
1986 19 15 597 587 
1987 17 17 564 520 
1988 20 22 678 676 
1989 20 22 701 688 
1990 17 17 419 483 
1991 4 9 369 376 
1992 24 13 469 434 
1993 18 25 573 535 
1994 23 20 738 642 
1995 25 22 875 883 
1996 2 15 1101 1091 
1997 11 9 1490 1377 
1998  3 572 561 
TOTAL 289 289 10841 10398 
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Table 2  
    
The sampling procedure for the spin-off sample. 
    
This table lists the various steps in the sampling procedure used for identifying spin-offs 
announced and completed between 1979 and April 30, 1998.  Spin-offs are from the 
CRSP tapes, the SDC Worldwide Acquisition database, publications such as  Moody's 
Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions, and news wires and articles from Lexis-
Nexis and the  Wall Street Journal. Column A describes the selection process. The 
number of firms and bonds having available data at each stage are enumerated. Trader 
quotes are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database 
(FID). The final sample includes all parent firms and their outstanding nonconvertible 
bonds that have trader quotes available in and around the spin-off announcement month. 
  
    
Column A No. of firms No. of bonds  
       
Initial list of spin-offs from 289    
CRSP and SDC database      
       
       
Parent firms (bonds) having  42 168  
trader quoted bond data available       
       
Parent firms (bonds) having       
trader quoted bond data available  37 123  
in the month of the spin-off announcement      
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Table 3 
The sampling procedure for the mergers and acquisition sample. 
    
This table lists the various steps in the sampling procedure used for all completed mergers 
and acquisitions identified in the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database for the 
period 1979 to April 30, 1998. Column A describes the selection process. The number of firms 
and bonds having available data at each stage are enumerated. Trader quotes are identified 
from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). The final sample 
includes all acquiring firms and their outstanding nonconvertible bonds that have trader 
quotes available in and around the merger/acquisition announcement month. 
      
     
Column A No.of firms No. of bonds   
        
Initial list of mergers and acquisitions 11,834     
 from SDC Platinum Mergers and       
Acquisition database.       
        
Acquirer firms matched to the spin-off 302     
sample by year of announcement and       
industry of parent firm.       
        
Matched acquirer firms (bonds) having  133 643   
trader-quoted bond data available.        
        
Matched acquirer firms (bonds) having trader- 131 619   
quoted bond data available in the month       
of the merger/acquisition announcement.       
        
      
    
 
 108 
 
Table 4 
 
A comparison of sample sizes of studies using corporate bond data. 
    
    
    
AUTHOR (S) PAPER 
SAMPLE 
PERIOD 
SAMPLE 
SIZE (NO. 
OF 
FIRMS) 
 
    
Dittmar, A.K. (2000) 1983 - 1995 19  
 
Capital structure in 
corporate spin-offs    
    
Warga, A. and Welch, I., (1993) 1985 - 1989 16  
 
Bondholder losses in 
leveraged buyouts    
    
Schipper, K. and Smith, A., (1983) 1963 - 1981 13 (a) 
 
Effects of recontracting on 
shareholder wealth: the 
case of voluntary spin-offs 
   
    
Hite, G.L. and Owers, J.E., (1983) 1962-1981 31 (b) 
 
Security price reactions 
around corporate spin-off 
announcements 
   
    
Maxwell, W.F. and Rao, R.P., (2002) 1976-1997 80 (c) 
 
Do spin-offs expropriate 
wealth from bondholders?    
    
    
(a):  Sample includes firms having nonconvertible and/or convertible bonds. 
(b):  Sample comprise of firms having all types of senior securities, i.e., both bonds and 
preferred stocks of convertible and nonconvertible types. 
(c):  Sample includes all publicly traded debt of firms that announced a spin-off in the sample 
period. No distinction is made between convertible and nonconvertible bonds. 
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Table 5 
Risk maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the spin-off announcement for all 
bonds. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identif ied from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, 
publications such as Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall 
Street Journal   for the period 1979 to early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement month is identified as month 0. A risk-
maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimension of risk and 
maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity -benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each 
event month to calculate the abnormal return. The significance of the mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic. The last column of 
the table gives the proportion of bonds with positive abnormal returns. Binomial tests for whether this proportion is significantly different 
from 50% are also reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the 
Binomial tests. 
    t-statistic % of bonds  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of firms  No. of bonds abnormal return  % abnormal return abnormal returns 
-12 33 105 0.1467 1.77        62.86%  *** 
-11 33 106 0.0198 0.22 55.66% 
-10 33 109 -0.0271 -0.34 44.95% 
-9 33 108 0.0016 0.02 50.93% 
-8 33 110 -0.1400 -1.55 45.45% 
-7 34 112 -0.0586 -0.61 47.32% 
-6 35 110 -0.1908 -2.45 47.27% 
-5 37 114 -0.0959 -1.32 42.98% 
-4 37 117 -0.3214 -3.03       31.62%  *** 
-3 36 114 -0.1733 -1.77 45.61% 
-2 37 120 -0.0488 -0.54 50.00% 
-1 37 120 -0.1463 -1.42    41.67%  * 
0 37 123 -0.2642 -3.36       37.40%  *** 
1 35 121 -0.0600 -0.61       35.54%  *** 
2 35 121 -0.0341 -0.33 50.41% 
3 35 127 -0.1961 -2.85       33.86%  *** 
4 34 127 0.1132 1.85 54.33% 
5 35 130 -0.0197 -0.26 43.85% 
6 34 119 -0.2833 -2.60 37.82% 
7 34 119 0.0509 0.65 51.26% 
8 34 120 0.0407 0.45 50.83% 
9 33 116 -0.0078 -0.08     42.24%  * 
10 34 120 -0.0302 -0.38 45.00% 
11 35 121 0.1107 1.35     57.85%   * 
12 35 120 -0.0734 -0.82 48.33% 
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Table 6  
Risk maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the spin-off announcement for 
one bond per firm. 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, 
publications such as Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall  
Street Journal for the period 1979 to early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. A risk-
maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of risk and 
maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity -benchmark index is subtracted from corresponding monthly raw return in each 
event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the abnormal returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated across 
all bonds for the same firm and then averaged  across firms in each event month. The significance of the mean is determined using a 
two-tail t-statistic. The last column of the table gives the proportion of firms with positiv e abnormal returns. Binomial tests for whether this 
proportion is significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
    t-statistic % of firms  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of bonds No. of firms  abnormal return % abnormal return abnormal returns 
-12 105 33 0.1291 0.96 51.52% 
-11 106 33 -0.0966 -0.80 45.45% 
-10 109 33 -0.0036 -0.03  42.42% 
-9 108 33 -0.1755 -1.34  48.48% 
-8 110 33 -0.3492 -2.42       33.33%  ** 
-7 112 34 -0.0751 -0.57 41.18% 
-6 110 35 -0.4018 -2.52 40.00% 
-5 114 37 -0.1509 -1.13 40.54% 
-4 117 37 -0.1658 -1.12     35.14%  * 
-3 114 36 -0.1678 -1.42 41.67% 
-2 120 37 -0.0288 -0.19 45.95% 
-1 120 37 -0.0853 -0.45 40.54% 
0 123 37 -0.2509 -2.33 40.54% 
1 121 35 0.0364 0.23 51.43% 
2 121 35 -0.1714 -0.92 45.71% 
3 127 35 -0.1215 -0.96 42.86% 
4 127 34 0.0875 0.85 58.82% 
5 130 35 -0.0944 -0.63     34.29%  * 
6 119 34 -0.2791 -1.70 38.24% 
7 119 34 -0.0429 -0.33  47.06% 
8 120 34 -0.1211 -1.14  50.00% 
9 116 33 -0.1018 -0.60     36.36%  * 
10 120 34 -0.0069 -0.04 44.12% 
11 121 35 0.0289 0.18 48.57% 
12 120 35 -0.0667 -0.37 45.71% 
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Table 7 
  
Risk-maturity-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
                          
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms 
that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are 
identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company's (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition  
database, publications such as Moody's Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and 
news wires and articles from Lexis- Nexis and the Wall Street Journal for the period 1979 to 
early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available  in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database 
for each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity-adjusted 
benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the 
dimension of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity-benchmark index 
is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the 
abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by first aggregating 
across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in each event 
month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, i.e., for three 
months, seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. The 
parametric test statistic of Barber and Lyon (1997) is used to test the significance of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return. 
 
          
          
          
Period  CAR   CAR   CAR     
  -1 to +1  -1 to +6  -6 to +6    
           
          
Mean %  -0.320  -0.883  -1.983    
t-statistic  -1.288  -1.863  -2.853    
No. of firms  35  34  33    
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Table 8  
Industry-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the spin-off 
announcement for all bonds. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, 
publications such as Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall 
Street Journal   for the period 1979 to early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly  bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement month is identified as month 0. An 
industry -maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of 
industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry -maturity -benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly 
raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. The significance of the mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic. 
The last column of the table gives the proportion of bonds with positive abnormal returns. Binomial tests for whether this proportion is 
significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of 
confidence respectively for the Binomial tests.  
    t-statistic % of bonds  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of firms  No. of bonds abnormal return % abnormal return abnormal returns 
-12 33 108 0.1341 1.57         62.04%  *** 
-11 33 109 -0.0077 -0.09   53.21% 
-10 33 112 -0.0819 -0.99   42.86% 
-9 33 111 -0.0814 -1.02      42.34%  * 
-8 33 113 -0.1818 -1.87   45.13% 
-7 34 114 -0.0705 -0.78   47.37% 
-6 35 112 -0.2014 -2.62    45.54% 
-5 37 114 -0.0809 -1.12   45.61% 
-4 37 117 -0.3433 -3.36         35.04%  *** 
-3 36 116 -0.2225 -2.31    43.10% 
-2 37 123 -0.0842 -0.97    50.41% 
-1 37 123 -0.2028 -1.85         37.40%  *** 
0 37 123 -0.2884 -3.66         37.39%  *** 
1 35 122 -0.0268 -0.27   43.44% 
2 35 122 -0.0602 -0.58   50.82% 
3 35 124 -0.1766 -2.40       41.94%  * 
4 34 124 0.0677 1.02    54.84% 
5 35 126 -0.0720 -0.95    46.03% 
6 34 112 -0.3200 -2.88         36.61%  *** 
7 34 114 0.0442 0.53   47.37% 
8 34 113 -0.0013 -0.01   53.98% 
9 33 109 -0.0842 -0.85        38.53%  ** 
10 34 113 -0.0215 -0.25   45.13% 
11 35 115 0.1300 1.57         61.74%  *** 
12 35 114 -0.0305 -0.36    45.61% 
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Table 9 
Industry-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the spin-off 
announcement for one bond per firm. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, 
publications such as Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall 
Street Journal  for the period 1979 to early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available  in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. An industry -
maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of industry and 
maturity. For each bond the return on the industry -maturity -benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in 
each event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the abnormal returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated 
across all bonds for the same firm and then averaged across firms in each event month. The significance of the mean is determined 
using a two-tail t-statistic. The last column of the table gives the proportion of firms with positive abnormal returns. Binomial tests for 
whether this proportion is significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
    t-statistic % of firms  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of bonds No. of firms  abnormal return % abnormal return abnormal returns 
-12 108 33 0.1909 1.46 51.52% 
-11 109 33 -0.1223 -1.07 45.45% 
-10 112 33 -0.0388 -0.27 42.42% 
-9 111 33 -0.2105 -1.60 48.48% 
-8 113 33 -0.2618 -1.87     33.33%  ** 
-7 114 34 -0.0351 -0.30 41.18% 
-6 112 35 -0.3872 -2.41 40.00% 
-5 114 37 -0.1276 -0.97 40.54% 
-4 117 37 -0.1829 -1.44     35.14%  * 
-3 116 36 -0.1531 -1.30 41.67% 
-2 123 37 -0.0238 -0.17 45.95% 
-1 123 37 -0.0355 -0.19 40.54% 
0 123 37 -0.2479 -2.20 40.54% 
1 122 35 0.0669 0.43 51.43% 
2 122 35 -0.1255 -0.66 45.71% 
3 124 35 -0.0537 -0.41 42.86% 
4 124 34 0.0716 0.65 58.82% 
5 126 35 -0.2341 -1.96      34.29%  ** 
6 112 34 -0.2400 -1.61 38.24% 
7 114 34 -0.0050 -0.04 47.06% 
8 113 34 -0.0996 -1.00 50.00% 
9 109 33 -0.0374 -0.20    36.36%  * 
10 113 34 0.1015 0.68 44.12% 
11 115 35 0.0978 0.69 48.57% 
12 114 35 0.0289 0.19 45.71% 
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Table 10  
Industry-maturity-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms 
that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are 
identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company's (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition  
database, publications such as Moody's Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and 
news wires and articles from Lexis- Nexis and the Wall Street Journal for the period 1979 to 
early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available  in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are Identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database 
for each event month. The announcement is Identified as month 0. An industry-maturity-
adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in 
the dimension of industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry-maturity-
benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month 
to calculate the abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by 
first aggregating across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in 
each event month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, 
i.e., for three months, seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. 
The parametric test statistic of Barber and Lyon (1997) is used to test the significance of the 
mean cumulative abnormal return. 
       
       
       
Period  CAR   CAR   CAR  
  -1 to +1  -1 to +6  -6 to +6 
        
       
Mean %  -0.2223  -0.795  -1.781 
t-statistic  -0.919  -1.990  -3.318 
No. of firms  35  34  33 
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Table 11  
Cross-sectional variation in the risk-adjusted monthly abnormal returns response 
to the spin-off. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms 
that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are 
identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company's (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition  
database, publications such as Moody's Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and 
news wires and articles from Lexis- Nexis and the Wall Street Journal for the period 1979 to 
early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available  in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database 
for each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity-adjusted 
benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the 
dimension of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity-benchmark index 
is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the 
abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by first aggregating 
across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in each event 
month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, i.e., for three 
months, seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. Panel A 
reports the abnormal returns for the group of firms that have a positive bond market response to 
the announcement in month 0. Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the group of firms 
having a negative bond market response to the announcement in month 0. Welch's 
approximation of Student t-distribution is used to test the differences in the means of the two 
groups. 
Period  Month 0  CAR  CAR  CAR  
    -1 to +1  -1 to +6  -6 to +6  
Panel A: positive returns         
          
Mean %  0.315  0.865  1.079  0.857  
t-statistic  5.657  3.120  4.414  3.933  
No. of firms  15  15  14  11  
          
Panel B: negative returns         
           
Mean %  -0.637  -1.208  -2.256  -3.402  
t-statistic  -5.281  -5.210  -3.595  -3.794  
No. of firms  22  20  20  22  
          
Panel C : Differences in means         
          
t-statistic  7.167  5.736  4.952  4.615  
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Table 12  
Cross sectional variation in the industry-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal 
returns response to the spin-off. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms 
that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are 
identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company's (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition  
database, publications such as Moody's Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions , and 
news wires and articles from Lexis- Nexis and the Wall Street Journal for the period 1979 to 
early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available  in and 
around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database 
for each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. An industry-maturity-
adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in 
the dimension of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry-maturity-
benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month 
to calculate the abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by 
first aggregating across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in 
each event month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, 
i.e., for three months, seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. 
Panel A reports the abnormal returns for the group of firms that have a positive bond market 
response to the announcement in month 0. Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the group 
of firms having a negative bond market response to the announcement in month 0. Welch's 
approximation of Student t-distribution is used to test the differences in the means of the two 
groups. 
 
Period  Month 0  CAR  CAR  CAR 
    -1 to +1  -1 to +6  -6 to +6 
         
Panel A: positive returns        
         
Mean %  0.398  0.990  1.122  1.433 
t-statistic  6.963  3.530  3.830  4.141 
No. of firms  13  15  14  9 
         
Panel B: negative returns        
          
Mean %  -0.598  -1.132  -2.137  -2.986 
t-statistic  -4.941  -5.778  -4.777  -5.416 
No. of firms  24  20  20  24 
         
Panel C : Differences in means        
         
t-statistic  8.098  6.201  6.095  6.788 
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Table 13   
Bond returns and covenant protection. 
 
This Table provides evidence for the possible effect of covenant protection on the abnormal returns of all the 
nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced a spin-off in the period 1979 to April 30, 1998. All 
nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and around the spin-off announcement 
month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Each bond is tracked from 
the announcement month to the completion of the spin-off, defined as the spin-off event period. The announcement 
month is identified as month 0. Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for the announcement 
month.  A risk-maturity-adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in 
the dimension of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity-benchmark index is subtracted from 
the corresponding monthly raw return to calculate the abnormal announcement return. The average abnormal 
announcement return is calculated for different subsamples (i.e., the sample of the bonds that disappeared, and the 
sample of bonds that remained outstanding between the announcement month and the completion (ex-date) of each 
spin-off). The s ignificance of the mean is determined using a two-tailed t-statistic. The last two rows of the table give the 
t-statistics for the difference in means of the subsamples. T-statistics for difference in means of the announcement 
returns are calculated for the paired sample of bonds for the same firm, between the bonds that disappeared and the 
bond that remained outstanding during the spin-off event period for the same firm. T-statistics are also used to test for 
the difference in means of the announcement returns of all the disappeared bonds and the bonds outstanding for all the 
firms in the sample during the spin-off event period. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of 
confidence respectively. 
No. of parent firms having trader quoted bond data available in the month of the spin-off 
announcement 37 
No. of bonds of parent firms having bond data available in the month of the spin-off 
announcement 134 
No. of bonds of parent firms that disappeared between the announcement month and the ex-date 
of the spin-off 10 
No. of bonds of the same parent firms that did not disappear between the announcement month 
and the ex-date of the spin-off 18 
Average announcement return of all bonds that disappeared between the announcement month 
and the ex-date of the spin-off, for the entire sample of parent firms  0.4124 * 
Average announcement return of all bonds that did not disappear between the announcement 
month and the ex-date of the spin-off, for the paired sample of parent firms  -0.3491 ** 
Average announcement return of all bonds that did not disappear between the announcement 
month and the ex-date of the spin-off, for the entire sample of parent firms  -0.2585 *** 
t-statistics for the test of difference in means between the announcement returns of bonds that 
disappeared and the announcement returns of bonds that did not disappeared for the paired 
sample of parent firms  
2.361 ** 
t-statistics for the test of difference in means between the announcement returns of bonds that 
disappeared and the announcement returns of bonds that did not disappeared for the entire 
sample of parent firms  2.933 ** 
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Table 14  
Bond rating changes for the parent spin-off sample. 
 
 
Details of number of firms (bonds) that experienced S&P or Moody's bond rating changes either 
between one month prior to the spin-off announcement and one month, or six months, or one 
year subsequent to the announcement date. 
  
    
       
      
Months around 
announcement month 
 -1 to +1  -1 to +6  -1 to +12 
       
       
Panel A: No. of firms      
       
Increase in bond rating  0  4  5 
        
Decrease in bond ratings  3  4  15 
        
No change in rating  34  29  17 
        
Total   37  37  37 
       
       
Panel B: No. of bonds      
       
Increase in bond rating 0  11  12 
       
Decrease in bond ratings 29  32  56 
       
No change in rating 94  80  55 
       
Total  123  123  123 
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Table 15 
Risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the merger/acquisition 
announcement for all bonds of the matched acquirer sample. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition 
between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off sample by year of  announcement and industry of parent firm in the spin-off. 
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm 
that have trader quotes available in and around the merger announcement month are identified f rom the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The 
announcement month is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk- maturity -benchmark index is 
subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return.  The significance of the 
mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic . The last column of the  table gives the proportion of bonds with positive abnormal returns. 
Binomial tests for whether this proportion is significantly different from 50% are also  reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
    t-statistic % of bonds  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of firms  No. of bonds abnormal return % 
abnormal 
return abnormal returns 
-12 116 473 0.1388 3.71      54.76%  ** 
-11 118 496 0.0558 1.45       57.46%  *** 
-10 115 513 0.0496 1.21           49.32% 
-9 119 523 0.0006 0.02 50.86% 
-8 125 546 -0.0714 -2.41    46.34%  * 
-7 126 552 -0.0177 -0.57 49.46% 
-6 129 570 -0.0097 -0.33 47.72% 
-5 129 581 0.0605 1.81 51.64% 
-4 129 595 0.0408 1.21    53.45%  * 
-3 129 601 -0.0762 -2.53     44.93%  ** 
-2 131 610 -0.0180 -0.57 50.66% 
-1 133 615 -0.0033 -0.12 49.11% 
0 133 619 -0.0186 -0.64 48.79% 
1 132 624 -0.0799 -2.77      46.15%  ** 
2 133 636 -0.0795 -2.47     46.54%  * 
3 132 643 -0.0304 -1.12 47.74% 
4 132 644 -0.0487 -1.53    46.58%  * 
5 132 650 -0.0415 -1.45 47.23% 
6 132 644 -0.0709 -2.29      45.19%  ** 
7 133 650 0.0036 0.13 50.92% 
8 133 655 -0.0263 -0.93 48.55% 
9 133 667 0.0257 0.99 50.37% 
10 132 676 -0.0611 -2.40       44.23%  *** 
11 131 678 -0.0434 -1.84 47.94% 
12 135 690 -0.1035 -4.56       42.46%  *** 
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Table 16  
Risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the merger/acquisition 
announcement averaged for one bond per firm of the matched acquirer sample. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition 
between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm. 
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm 
that have trader quotes available in and around the merger announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The 
announcement month is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of risk and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity - benchmark index is 
subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the abnormal 
returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated across all bonds for the same firm and then averaged across firms in each event 
month. The significance of the mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic. The last column of the table gives the proportion of bonds 
with positive abnormal returns. Binomial tests for whether this proportion is significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same 
column. ***,* *,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
Event Month No. of bonds No. of firms  
Mean abnormal 
return 
% 
t-statistic for 
mean abnormal 
return 
% of firms  with 
positive abnormal 
returns  
-12 473 116 0.1424 2.02     59.48%  ** 
-11 496 118 0.0629 1.02 56.78% 
-10 513 115 0.1142 0.95 46.09% 
-9 523 119 -0.0405 -0.64 44.54% 
-8 546 125 -0.1076 -2.11      40.00%  ** 
-7 552 126 0.0173 0.30 51.59% 
-6 570 129 0.0619 1.21 50.39% 
-5 581 129 0.0476 0.63 49.61% 
-4 595 129 0.0814 0.82 44.19% 
-3 601 129 -0.1088 -2.26       34.88%  *** 
-2 610 131 -0.0701 -1.45 45.04% 
-1 615 133 0.0252 0.48 49.62% 
0 619 133 0.0099 0.22 46.62% 
1 624 132 0.0004 0.01 46.21% 
2 636 133 -0.0705 -1.47    42.11%  * 
3 643 132 -0.0420 -0.85 46.21% 
4 644 132 -0.0220 -0.41 43.18% 
5 650 132 -0.0316 -0.63    42.42%  * 
6 644 132 -0.0387 -0.71 43.94% 
7 650 133 0.0433 0.80 51.88% 
8 655 133 -0.0419 -0.86 47.37% 
9 667 133 0.0138 0.30 55.64% 
10 676 132 0.0472 1.01 50.76% 
11 678 131 -0.0202 -0.52 50.38% 
12 690 135 -0.0993 -2.77       41.48%  *** 
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Table 17  
Risk-maturity-adjusted cumulative abnormal bond returns around the 
merger/acquisition announcement averaged for one bond per firm of the matched 
acquirer sample. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of 
acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition between 1979 to 
April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and 
industry of parent firm.  Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have 
trader quotes available in and around the spin-off announcement month are identified 
from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total 
return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The 
announcement is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity-adjusted benchmark index is 
constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimension of risk 
and maturity. For each bond the return on the risk-maturity-benchmark index is 
subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate 
the abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by first 
aggregating across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across 
firms in each event month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three 
event windows, i.e., For three months, seven months, and 13 months, around the 
merger/acquisition announcement month. The parametric test statistic of Barber and 
Lyon (1997) is used to test the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. 
        
        
        
Period  CAR  CAR  CAR  
  -1 to +1  -3 to +3  -6 to +6  
         
        
Mean %  0.037  -0.244  -0.122  
t-statistic  0.460  -1.878  -0.618  
No. of firms  132  130  127  
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Table 18 
Industry-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the merger/acquisition 
announcement for all bonds of the matched acquirer sample. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition 
between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm. 
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm 
that have trader quotes available in and around the merger announcement month are ident ified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The 
announcement month is identified as month 0. An industry -maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry -maturity -benchmark index 
is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. The significance of the 
mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic. The last column of the table gives the proportion of bonds with positive abnormal returns. 
Binomial tests for whether this proportion is significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same column. ***,**,*  indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
    t-statistic % of bonds  
   Mean for mean with positive 
Event Month No. of firms  No. of bonds abnormal return % 
abnormal     
return abnormal returns 
-12 116 477 0.1008 2.68     53.88%  * 
-11 118 499 0.0708 1.88        58.12%  *** 
-10 115 516 0.0279 0.70 47.09% 
-9 119 526 -0.0039 -0.11 50.57% 
-8 125 549 -0.0953 -3.31     45.36%  ** 
-7 126 555 -0.0427 -1.41       43.96%  *** 
-6 129 573 -0.0152 -0.50 46.95% 
-5 129 583 0.0793 2.50 51.29% 
-4 129 597 0.0255 0.77 51.26% 
-3 129 604 -0.0428 -1.47       44.37%  *** 
-2 131 612 -0.0192 -0.62 47.88% 
-1 133 617 0.0458 1.67 53.00% 
0 133 621 -0.0125 -0.45 48.63% 
1 132 626 -0.0530 -1.97       45.69%  *** 
2 133 638 -0.0535 -1.73 50.78% 
3 132 645 -0.0058 -0.22 46.98% 
4 132 646 -0.0552 -1.79      46.44%  ** 
5 132 652 -0.0264 -0.91     46.17%  ** 
6 132 646 -0.0510 -1.71      45.98%  ** 
7 133 652 0.0074 0.27 49.08% 
8 133 657 -0.0089 -0.33 50.08% 
9 133 669 0.0442 1.74 52.91% 
10 132 678 -0.0089 -0.37     46.76%  * 
11 131 680 -0.0120 -0.53 50.00% 
12 135 692 -0.0200 -0.91 48.99% 
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Table 19  
Industry-maturity-adjusted abnormal bond returns around the merger/acquisition 
announcement averaged for one bond per firm of the matched acquirer sample. 
 
Abnormal returns for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition 
between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm. 
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm 
that have trader quotes available in and around the merger announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the 
Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The 
announcement month is identified as month 0. An industry -maturity -adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry -maturity -benchmark index 
is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the abnormal 
returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated across all bonds for the same firm and then averaged across firms in each event 
month. The significance of the mean is determined using a two-tail t-statistic. The last column of the table gives the proportion of bonds 
with positive abnormal returns. Binomial tests for whether this proportion is significantly different from 50% are also reported in the same 
column. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively for the Binomial tests. 
Event Month No. of bonds No. of firms  
Mean abnormal 
return 
% 
t-statistic for 
mean abnormal 
return 
% of firms  with 
positive abnormal 
returns  
-12 477 116 0.1106 1.44 56.03% 
-11 499 118 0.0976 1.51 55.93% 
-10 516 115 0.1100 0.93 46.09% 
-9 526 119 -0.0739 -1.13 43.70% 
-8 549 125 -0.1346 -2.71      39.20%  ** 
-7 555 126 -0.0040 -0.07 47.62% 
-6 573 129 0.0829 1.42 49.61% 
-5 583 129 0.0788 1.14 52.71% 
-4 597 129 0.0728 0.72 48.84% 
-3 604 129 -0.0789 -1.69      37.21%  *** 
-2 612 131 -0.0544 -1.19 44.27% 
-1 617 133 0.0908 1.83 54.89% 
0 621 133 0.0113 0.26 46.62% 
1 626 132 0.0101 0.26 46.21% 
2 638 133 -0.0451 -1.05 45.86% 
3 645 132 0.0006 0.01 45.45% 
4 646 132 0.0117 0.23 43.18% 
5 652 132 0.0248 0.46 50.00% 
6 646 132 -0.0272 -0.50 47.73% 
7 652 133 0.0498 0.94 53.38% 
8 657 133 -0.0242 -0.55 51.88% 
9 669 133 0.0452 1.01       60.90%  *** 
10 678 132 0.1071 2.37 56.06% 
11 680 131 0.0419 1.09 56.49% 
12 692 135 -0.0249 -0.71 48.15% 
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Table 20 
Industry-maturity-adjusted cumulative abnormal bond returns around the 
merger/acquisition announcement averaged for one bond per firm of the matched 
acquirer sample. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that 
announced and completed a merger/acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-
off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm.  Mergers/acquisitions are identified 
from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm 
that have trader quotes available in and around the spin-off announcement month are identified from the 
monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the 
Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement is identified as identified as month 0. A 
industry-maturity-adjusted benchmark index is constructed from six Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond 
indexes in the dimension of industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry-maturity-
benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to 
calculate the abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by first 
aggregating across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in each event 
month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, i.e., for three months, 
seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. The parametric test statistic of 
Barber and Lyon (1997) is used to test the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. 
       
       
       
Period  CAR  CAR  CAR 
  -1 to +1  -3 to +3  -6 to +6 
        
       
Mean %  0.114  -0.076  0.2225 
t-statistic  1.424  -0.549  1.065 
No. of firms  132  128  126 
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Table 21 
Cross-sectional variation in the risk-adjusted monthly abnormal returns response 
in the bond markets to the merger/acquisition announcement by a matched sample 
of acquirer firms. 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer 
firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and 
matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm.  
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. 
All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and around the 
spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed 
Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for 
each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. A risk-maturity-adjusted 
benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the 
dimension of risk and maturity. For each bond, the return on the risk-maturity-benchmark index 
is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the 
abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by first aggregating 
across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in each event 
month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, i.e., for three 
months, seven months, and 13 months, around the merger/acquisition announcement month. 
Panel A reports the abnormal returns for the group of firms that have a positive bond market 
response to the announcement in month 0. Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the group 
of firms having a negative bond market response to the announcement in month 0. Welch's 
approximation of Student t-distribution is used to test the differences in the means of the two 
groups. 
Period  Month 0  CAR  CAR  CAR 
    -1 to +1  -3 to +3  -6 to +6 
Panel A: positive returns        
         
Mean %  0.387  0.840  1.172  1.764 
t-statistic  6.809  7.364  6.529  7.088 
No. of firms  62  54  45  54 
         
Panel B: negative returns        
         
Mean %  -0.320  -0.523  -0.994  -1.518 
t-statistic  -9.172  -10.191  -9.289  -10.304 
No. of firms  71  77  85  73 
         
Panel C : Differences in means        
         
t-statistic  10.658  10.016  10.364  7.177 
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Table 22 
Cross-sectional variation in the industry-maturity-adjusted monthly abnormal 
returns response in the bond markets to the merger/acquisition   announcement by 
a matched sample of acquirer firms. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the nonconvertible bonds of a sample of acquirer 
firms that announced and completed a merger/acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and 
matched to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm.  
Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. 
All nonconvertible bonds of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and around the 
spin-off announcement month are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed 
Income Database (FID). Monthly total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for 
each event month. The announcement is identified as month 0. An industry-maturity-adjusted 
benchmark index is constructed from ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the 
dimension of industry and maturity. For each bond the return on the industry-maturity-
benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding monthly raw return in each event month 
to calculate the abnormal return. The abnormal returns are computed on a per firm basis, by 
first aggregating across all bonds for the same firm and then taking the average across firms in 
each event month. Cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated for three event windows, 
i.e., for three months, seven months, and 13 months, around the spin-off announcement month. 
Panel A reports the abnormal returns for the group of firms that have a positive bond market 
response to the announcement in month 0. Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the group 
of firms having a negative bond market response to the announcement in month 0. Welch's 
approximation of Student t-distribution is used to test the differences in the means of the two 
groups. 
Period  Month 0  CAR  CAR  CAR 
    -1 to +1  -3 to +3  -6 to +6 
         
Panel A: positive returns        
         
Mean %  0.389  0.715  1.251  2.140 
t-statistic  7.129  6.916  6.744  7.788 
No. of firms  62  66  52  56 
         
Panel B: negative returns        
          
Mean %  -0.318  -0.487  -0.984  -1.312 
t-statistic  -9.162  -7.803  -9.286  -9.919 
No. of firms  71  66  76  70 
         
Panel C : Differences in means        
          
t-statistic  10.935  9.955  10.461  11.319 
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Table 23 
Bond rating changes for bonds of matched-acquirer sample. 
 
 
 
 
Details of number of firms that experienced S&P or Moody's bond rating 
changes either between three months prior to the mergers/acquisition 
announcement and one month, or six months, or one year subsequent to the 
announcement date. 
  
 
      
      
Months around 
announcement month 
  -3 to +1  -3 to +6 -3 to +12 
      
      
No. of firms     
      
Increase in bond rating  5  6  7 
        
Decrease in bond ratings  0  3  14 
        
No change in rating  128  124  112 
        
Total   133  133  133 
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Table 24 
Summary statistics for the spin-off sample. 
This table lists the parent and subsidiary firms statistics for the pre-spin-off year (i.e., in the year 
prior to the spin-off (t -1)) and the year post-spin-off. Book leverage is calculated as the ratio of 
long-term debt and current liabilities to book value of assets. Market -leverage is defined as the 
ratio of long-term debt and current liabilities to the sum of the market value of equity and book 
value of debt. Interest coverage is calculated as the ratio of operating cash flows to interest 
expenses. ROA is calculated as ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes to 
market value of assets of parent firm. ROA is adjusted for industry performance by subtracting 
the median ratio for all firms in the Compustat file with the same four-digit SIC code. ***,**,*  
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively. 
 
Panel A: Parent firms 
      
   Pre-spin-off Post-spin-off Change  
       
Total debt (millions)  13715.01157 11428.10036 -2305.74 * 
       
Size (millions)   36182.73 31473.76 -5546 * 
       
Book leverage   34.4% 33.3% -1.3% *** 
       
Market-leverage   38.8% 34.2% -4.3% ** 
       
Interest Coverage  5.53 6.98 1.29 * 
       
Industry adjusted DROA  -1.3% -3.3% -2.0%  
 
Panel B: Subsidiary firms 
    
   Pre-spin-off Post-spin-off Change  
      
Total debt (millions)  4402.64 5222.28 1626.67  
       
Size (millions)   8806.61 9757.53 1977.71 * 
       
Book leverage   29.2% 34.6% 5.1%  
       
Market-leverage   45.4% 38.1% -13.1%  
       
Relative size of subsidiary to 
parent 
  22.3% 28.7% 8.3%  
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Table 25 
Summary statistics of the matched mergers/acquisition sample. 
This table lists the acquirer and target firms’ statistics for the pre-merger/acquisition year (i.e., in 
the year prior to the merger/acquisition (t-1)) and the year post-merger/acquisition. The 
mergers/acquisition sample includes acquirer firms that announced and completed a merger/
acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and are matched to the spin-off sample by year of
announcement and industry of parent firm.  Mergers/acquisitions are identified from the SDC 
Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. Book leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-
term debt and current liabilities to book value of assets. Market-leverage is defined as the ratio 
of long-term debt and current liabilities to the sum of the market value of equity and book value 
of debt. Interest coverage is calculated as the ratio of operating cash flows to interest expenses.
ROA is calculated as ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes to market value 
of assets of parent firm. ROA is adjusted for industry performance by subtracting the median 
ratio for all firms in the Compustat file with the same four- digit SIC code.***,**,*  indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively.  
Panel A: Acquirer firms       
     Pre-merger Post-merger Change   
             
Total debt (millions)   7792.69 12141.24 4133.90 ***  
            
Size (millions)    34374.37 46867.74 11538.24***  
            
Book leverage    23.6% 26.4%               3.0% ***  
            
Market-leverage   46.6% 46.9% 1.2%    
            
Interest Coverage   5.66 6.13 47.1%    
            
Industry adjusted DROA   -1.1% -4.5% -3.4% ***  
Panel B: Target firms      
     Pre-merger Post-merger Change   
             
Total debt (millions)   3946.88 11503.47 3647.88 **  
            
Size (millions)    13485.30 36088.59 7512.31 **  
            
Book leverage    25.8% 33.9% 5.4% **  
            
Market-leverage   43.6% 42.7% 0.1%   
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Table 26 
Correlation matrix - spin-off sample. 
 
     
D Bondholder  wealth 1
 .
Pre-spin-off market leverage of parent -0.164 1
 (0.069) * .
D leverage of parent -0.267 -0.053 1
(0.061) * (0.382) .
D ROA of parent 0.047 0.041 0.104 1
(0.396) (0.412) (0.289) .
D Rating -0.081 0.095 -0.050 0.179 1
(0.317) (0.291) (0.387) (0.159) .
Post-Marriott -0.277 -0.141 -0.119 0.224 -0.133 1
(0.049) ** (0.206) (0.248) (0.105) * (0.217) .
Focus 0.073 0.180 0.012 0.058 0.041 0.159 1
(0.334)  (0.147) (0.474) (0.373)  (0.405) (0.174) .
Postspinoff relative size -0.138 0.025 0.001  0.020 0.181 0.301 0.121 1
(0.211)  (0.443) (0.497) (0.456) (0.145) (0.037)** 0.241 .
Post-spinoff relative leverage -0.143 0.175 0.180 0.144 0.192 0.23 0.12 0.335 1
(0.222)  (0.177) (0.171) (0.232) (0.151) (0.107)* 0.259 (0.033) ** .
D ROA of parent X D Rating -0.240 0.012 -0.063 0.217 0.043 0.154 0.235 0.205  -0.257 1
(0.089) * (0.474) (0.368) (0.113) (0.406) (0.196) 0.094* (0.13) (0.093) *
Focus X D ROA of parent -0.050 0.008 0.038 0.961 0.182 0.2146 -0.121 -0.009 0.1061 0.1711 1
(0.384) (0.482) (0.412) (0.000) *** (0.140) (0.101)* (0.237) (0.478) (0.266) (0.156)
Post-
spinoff 
relative 
leverage
D ROA 
X D 
Rating 
of 
parent
Focus 
X D 
ROA 
of 
parent
D 
Rating
Post-
Marriott Focus 
Post-
spinoff 
relative 
size
D 
Bondholder 
wealth
Pre-spin-
off 
market 
leverage 
of parent 
D 
leverage 
of parent
D ROA 
of 
parent
Pearson correlation coefficients for each variable for the 37 firms which had data available. D Bondholder wealth is the index-adjusted return of parent firm bonds in the 
month of announcement. D leverage of parent is the change in market leverage of the parent. D ROA is the change in the ratio of earnings before interest depreciation and 
taxes to market value of assets. D Rating is defined Dummy=1 if credit rating decreased post-spinoff. Post-Marriott is defined Dummy=1 if announcement date is after 
Marriott spin-off ex-date.Focus is defined as .Dummy=1 if parent firm focus increases post-spinoff. Post-spinoff realative size is the ratio of size of subsidiary to parent 
size. Post-spinoff relative leverage is ratio of market leverage of parent to that of subsidiary. D ROA of parent X D Rating measures the interaction of post-spinoff change 
in operational efficiency of parent with the change in risk of parent firm. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level of confidence resply.
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Table 27 
Correlation matrix  - mergers & acquisition sample.  
 
 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients for each variable for the firms in the Mergers and Acquisition sample for  which Compustat data is available. D Bondholder wealth is the 
index-adjusted return of parent firm bonds in the month of announcement. Leverage of parent is the change in market (book) leverage of the parent.
D ROA is the change in the ratio of earnings before interest depreciation and taxes to market value of assets. "yr" is the Year of announcement.
D Rating is defined Dummy=1 if credit rating decreased in the twelve months post merger/acquisition.. 
 ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level of confidence resply.
 
D 
Bondhol
der 
returns
Variance 
(Rating) 
Change
Acquirer 
Pre 
Market 
Value
Acquirer 
Change 
in 
Market 
Value
Acquirer 
Pre 
Total 
debt
Acquirer 
Change 
in Total 
Debt
Acquirer 
Pre 
Booklev
erage
Acquirer 
Change 
in 
Booklev
erage 
Acquirer 
Pre 
Marketle
verage
Acquirer 
Post 
Marketle
verage
Acquirer 
Change 
in 
Marketle
verage
Acquirer 
Pre-
merger 
Size
Acquirer 
Change 
in ROA 
Acquirer 
Change 
in 
industry 
adjusted 
ROA 
Target 
Pre 
Market 
Value
Target 
Change 
in 
Market 
Value
Target 
Pre 
Total 
Debt
Target 
Change 
in Total 
Debt
D Bondholder 
returns
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.259 0.029 -0.05 0.087 -0.096 0.012 -0.202 0.133 0.212 -0.293 0.072 -0.3 0.299 0.21 -0.207 0.186 -0.206
Significance . 0.035 0.421 0.371 0.273 0.261 0.467 0.082 0.184 0.081 0.025 0.309 0.025 0.026 0.091 0.198 0.119 0.199
Variance 
(Rating) Change
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.048 -0.028 0.011 0.006 0.052 -0.146 -0.154 -0.127 0.031 -0.019 0.04 0.019 -0.192 0.003 -0.07 -0.008
Significance 0.374 0.428 0.471 0.485 0.36 0.159 0.149 0.202 0.419 0.447 0.4 0.451 0.111 0.496 0.331 0.486
Acquirer Pre 
Market Value
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.162 0.857 -0.15 0.292 0.217 -0.024 -0.071 0.005 0.727 0.12 -0.259 0.567 -0.419 0.613 -0.515
Significance 0.144 0 0.163 0.022 0.071 0.437 0.321 0.487 0 0.227 0.051 0 0.037 0 0.012
Acquirer 
Change in 
Market Value
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.455 0.926 0.132 0.274 -0.424 -0.399 -0.028 -0.613 0.051 0.117 -0.344 0.907 -0.406 0.884
Significance 0.001 0 0.194 0.034 0.002 0.003 0.427 0 0.38 0.242 0.017 0 0.006 0
Acquirer Pre 
Total debt
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.557 0.297 0.056 0.274 0.239 -0.019 0.836 0.042 -0.215 0.781 -0.68 0.851 -0.797
Significance 0 0.018 0.351 0.03 0.057 0.45 0 0.394 0.083 0 0.001 0 0
Acquirer 
Change in Total 
Debt
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.031 0.283 -0.538 -0.579 0.1 -0.623 0.118 0.057 -0.456 0.873 -0.523 0.899
Significance 0.418 0.027 0 0 0.257 0 0.234 0.363 0.002 0 0 0
Acquirer Pre 
Bookleverage
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.261 0.016 -0.174 -0.183 -0.053 0.022 -0.27 0.222 0.139 0.187 0.006
Significance 0.035 0.458 0.126 0.114 0.356 0.443 0.04 0.078 0.285 0.117 0.49
Acquirer 
Change in 
Bookleverage 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.249 -0.518 -0.12 -0.006 0.329 -0.236 0.043 0.292 -0.069 0.276
Significance 0.045 0 0.216 0.484 0.017 0.066 0.394 0.112 0.331 0.127
Acquirer Pre 
Marketleverage
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.879 0.05 0.314 -0.213 -0.103 0.169 -0.64 0.28 -0.653
Significance 0 0.372 0.015 0.091 0.26 0.149 0.002 0.04 0.001
Acquirer Post 
Marketleverage
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.274 0.314 -0.368 0.123 0.236 -0.626 0.347 -0.675
Significance 0.034 0.018 0.011 0.232 0.077 0.002 0.016 0.001
Acquirer 
Change in 
Marketleverage
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.03 0.183 -0.379 -0.177 -0.003 -0.126 0.123
Significance 0.422 0.135 0.009 0.144 0.496 0.225 0.308
Acquirer Pre-
merger Size
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.012 -0.193 0.544 -0.792 0.617 -0.854
Significance 0.468 0.107 0 0 0 0
Acquirer 
Change in ROA 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.256 -0.022 0.068 0.058 0.118
Significance 0.049 0.45 0.401 0.368 0.331
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Table 28 
Effects of leverage in Model 1 for spin-off sample.  
 
 
     
 
        
        
  
 Regression 1  
 
Regression 2 
 
       
Intercept  -0.119   -0.058    
       
D leverage -0.270 * -0.265 *  
       
Ppre-leverage -0.175  -0.167    
       
PSpost-leverage   -0.026   
       
SPpost-size   -0.125   
       
       
R-square  9.80%  11.70%   
N              37                      37   
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Table 29 
Effects of changes in operational efficiency (Model 2) for spin-off sample. 
 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions relating announcement-period abnormal 
returns of parent firm bonds to change in operational efficiency of parent firm. Change in 
operational efficiency of parent firm (D PROA) is measured as the difference in pre- and 
post-spin-off industry-adjusted ROA of parent. ROA is calculated as ratio of earnings before 
interest, depreciation, and taxes to market value of assets of parent firm. ROA is adjusted 
for industry performance by subtracting the median ratio for all firms in the Compustat file 
with the same four-digit SIC code. Change in Focus (Focus) is defined as Dummy=1 if 
parent firm Focus increases post-spin-off. Post-spin-off relative size of the subsidiary to the 
parent (SPpost-size) is used as control variable. D ROA of parent X Focus measures the 
interaction of post-spin-off change in operational efficiency of parent with the change in 
focus of parent firm. Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal abnormal return of 
parent firm bonds in the month of announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% level of confidence respectively. 
      
      
      
      
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  
      
Intercept -0.137  -0.246  -0.048  
      
D PROA 0.046  0.041  1.327 **  
      
Focus   0.087  -0.141  
      
SPpost-size -0.138  -0.148    
      
D PROA * Focus    -1.342 **  
      
      
R-square 2.10%  2.90%  13.37%  
N              37              37              37   
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Table 30 
Effects of changes in business risk (Model 3) for spin-off sample. 
        
This table shows cross-sectional regressions relating announcement-
period abnormal returns of parent firm bonds to change in variance of 
parent firm's rate of return. Change in variance of parent firm's rate of 
return is measured as the change in credit ratings of parent firms 
(Rating) because of the spin-off announcement. D Rating is defined as 
Dummy=1 if the credit rating of parent firm decreases because of the 
spin-off announcement. Post Marriott is defined as Dummy=1 if the 
announcement date was after the ex-date of the Marriott spin-off. D 
ROA of parent X D Rating measures the interaction of post-spin-off 
change in operational efficiency of parent with the change in risk of 
parent firm. Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal 
abnormal return of parent firm bonds in the month of announcement. 
***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence 
respectively. 
 
      
      
      
   Regression 1         Regression 2  
      
Intercept    -0.0385  -0.0378  
      
D Rating    -0.0071  -0.0062  
      
Post Marriott  -0.2301 * -0.2313 * 
      
D ROA of parent X D Rating    0.0166  
      
      
R-
square 
   5.24%  5.26%  
N                36             36  
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Table 31 
Temporal changes in bond market reactions to spin-offs. 
   
          
This table shows cross-sectional regressions to study changes in bond market reactions to 
spin-offs over time. To study changes in bond market reactions to spin-offs over time that 
may or may not be attributed to the heightened bondholder activism following the Marriott 
spin-off, the spin-off sample is partitioned in the following ways: a) Spin-offs announced 
before October 1993 and spin-offs announced post October 1993 (including any 
announcements in October 1993), b) Spin-offs announced before 1988, between 1989 and 
September 1993, and post October 1993 c) Spin-offs announced between 1979 to 1990, 
between 1991 and 1995, and after January 1996 (including January 1996), and d) Spin-offs 
announced pre October 1993, between November 1993 and 1995, and after January 1996. 
Separate regressions are done on each individual time period dummy, separately for each 
partitioning of the sample. Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal abnormal 
return of parent firm bonds in the month of announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively. 
          
          
                    
    
Regression 1 
            
Regression 2 
       
Regression 3 
  
Regression 4 
 
            
            
Intercept   -0.04178 -0.09706 -0.21087** -0.24547** 
        
Dummy 1  -0.31437*      
        
Dummy 2   -0.24547*     
        
Dummy 3    -0.04722   
        
Dummy 4      -0.11168  
        
        
R-square   5.03%  6.03%  -2.61%  -1.06%   
N                  37                   37                37                 37   
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Table 32 
Effects of leverage (Model 1) for the sample of matched-acquirer firms. 
 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions relating announcement-period
abnormal returns of acquirer firm bonds to change in leverage of acquirer firm. 
Change in leverage of acquirer firm (D Aleverage) is measured as the difference in
pre- and post-merger market (book) leverage ratio of acquirer. Market (book) 
leverage ratio is calculated as ratio of (long-term debt + current liabilities) to (Market 
value of equity + book value of debt). Pre-merger market (book) leverage of acquirer 
(Apre-leverage), post-merger ratio of leverage of the acquirer to leverage of the 
target (ATpost-leverage) and post-merger change in relative size of the target to the 
acquirer (DTAsize) are used as control variables. Dependent variable is the index-
adjusted-abnormal abnormal return of acquirer firm bonds in the month of 
announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence 
respectively. 
          
 
          
          
    Regression 1   Regression 2 Regression 3  Regression 4
       
Intercept         -0.326 -1.017  0.542  0.651   
            
D leverage Market -0.216 -0.247*      
 Book    -0.252 * -0.251* 
          
          
Apre-leverage Market 0.185  0.173        
  Book    0.064     
           
ATpost-leverage -0.138   -0.216  -0.227* 
           
DTAsize  0.225 * 0.228 * 0.226 * 0.225 * 
            
            
R-square  8.90%  9.00% 7.60% 9.10%  
N   50         50         50         50   
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Table 33 
Effects of changes in operational efficiency (Model 2) for the   sample of 
matched-acquirer firms. 
 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions relating announcement-period abnormal returns 
of acquirer firm bonds to change in operational efficiency of acquirer firm. Change in 
operational efficiency (D ROA) is measured as the difference in pre- and post-merger industry-
adjusted ROA for the acquirer as well as the target firms. ROA is calculated as ratio of 
earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes to market value of assets of acquirer firm and 
is adjusted for industry performance by subtracting the median ratio for all firms in the 
Compustat file with the same four-digit SIC code. A conglomerate merger (Conglomerate) is 
defined as a merger where the acquirer and the target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes. 
Post-merger change in relative size of the target to the acquirer (DTAsize) is used as a control 
variable. Dependent variable is the index -adjusted-abnormal abnormal return of acquirer firm 
bonds in the month of announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
of confidence respectively. 
  
         
         
         
         
         Regression 1    Regression 2     
  
 
        
Intercept   1.152  1.409     
          
D ROA Acquirer Raw  -0.19   -0.194      
 Industry adjusted  0.203  0.212 *   
         
Conglomerate   -0.365*** -0.375 ***    
          
DTAsize   0.1      
          
D ROA Target Raw  -0.091       
  Industry adjusted  0.221  0.203    
          
R-square   20.90%  23.80%     
N                     50                 50       
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Table 34 
Effects of changes in risk (Model 3) for the sample of matched-acquirer 
firms. 
 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions relating announcement-period
abnormal returns of acquirer firm bonds to change in variance of acquirer 
firm's rate of return. Change in variance of acquirer firm's rate of return is 
measured as the change in credit ratings of acquirer firms (Rating) because of 
the merger announcement. Rating is defined as Dummy=-1 if the credit rating 
of acquirer firm decreases, Dummy=1 if the credit rating increases, and 
Dummy =0 if the credit rating remains unchanged because of the merger 
announcement. Change in leverage of acquirer firm (D Aleverage), measured
as the difference in pre- and post-merger leverage ratio of acquirer; and 
conglomerate merger (Conglomerate), defined as a merger where the 
acquirer and the target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes, are used as 
control variables. Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal
abnormal return of acquirer firm bonds in the month of announcement. ***,**,* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively. 
        
        
        
        
        Regression 1  Regression 2
  
  
      
Intercept    -0.283 0.88    
          
D Rating    -0.295*** -0.253*   
         
Conglomerate      -0.323***  
          
D Aleverage  -0.222* -0.143   
          
          
R-square    8.80%  16.80%    
N                    50             50    
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Table 35 
Full effects model (Model 4) for spin-off sample. 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regression to study the interaction effects of change in 
leverage, change in operational efficiency and change in variance of the returns of parent 
firm on the announcement-period abnormal returns of parent firm bonds. Change in 
leverage of parent firm (D Pleverage) is measured as the difference in pre- and post-spin-
off market-leverage ratio of parent. Change in operational efficiency of parent firm (D
PROA) is measured as the difference in pre- and post-spin-off industry-adjusted ROA of 
parent. Change in variance of parent firm's rate of return is measured as the change in 
credit ratings of parent firms (Rating) because of the spin-off announcement. Rating is 
defined as Dummy=1, if the credit rating of parent firm decreases because of the spin-off 
announcement. D ROA of parent X D Rating measures the interaction of post-spin-off 
change in operational efficiency of parent with the change in risk of parent firm. Focus X D
ROA of parent measures the interaction of post-spin-off change in operational efficiency 
of parent with the increase in Focus of the parent. Change in Focus (Focus) is defined as 
Dummy=1 if parent firm Focus increases post-spin-off. Post Marriott is defined as 
Dummy=1 if the announcement date was after the ex-date of the Marriott spin-off. 
Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal abnormal return of parent firm bonds 
in the month of announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of 
confidence respectively. 
   Regression 1  Regression 2  
      
Intercept    0.258  0.258  
      
Ppre-leverage  -0.221 * -0.225 * 
      
D leverage  -0.424 *** -0.430 *** 
      
D PROA  1.753 *** 1.750 *** 
      
Rating  -0.121  -0.125  
      
D ROA of parent X D Rating -0.296 * -0.286 ** 
      
Focus  -0.054  -0.058   
      
Focus X D ROA of parent  -1.571 *** -1.572 *** 
      
Post Marriott  -0.352 ** -0.356 ** 
      
SPpost-size    -0.032    
      
PSpost-leverage  0.014     
      
R-square    48.25%    48.18%  
N       37      37  
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Table 36 
Full effects model (Model 4) for the sample of matched-acquirer firms. 
This table shows cross-sectional regression to study the interaction effects of change in leverage, change in operational 
efficiency and change in variance of the returns of acquirers firm on the announcement-period cumulative abnormal 
returns of acquirer firm bonds. Change in leverage of acquirer (D Aleverage) is measured as the difference in pre- and
post-merger/acquisition market (book) leverage ratio of the acquirer. Change in operational efficiency of acquired firm (D
ROA) is measured as the difference in pre- and post- merger industry-adjusted (raw) ROA of acquirer as well as target 
firms. Change in variance of acquirer firm's rate of return is measured as the change in credit ratings of parent firms 
(Rating) because of the merger announcement. Rating is defined as Dummy=-1 if the credit rating of acquirer firm 
decreases , Dummy=1 if the credit rating increases, and Dummy =0 if the credit rating remains unchanged. Pre-merger 
total debt of the acquirer, post-merger ratio of leverage of the acquirer to leverage of the target (ATpost-leverage) and 
post-merger change in relative size of the target to the acquirer (DTAsize), and conglomerate merger (Conglomerate), 
defined as a merger where the acquirer and the target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes, are used as control 
variables. Dependent variable is the index-adjusted-abnormal abnormal return of parent firm bonds in the month of
announcement. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence respectively. 
    Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3  
Intercept   2.1 2.144  2.501  
          
Variance (Rating) Change   -0.24 * -0.224 * -0.225* 
          
Acquirer Pre Total Debt   0.132  0.132    
          
Acquirer Change in leverage Book  -0.088       
  Market   -0.046    
          
D ROA Acquirer Raw  -0.183 -0.198  -0.209* 
 
Industry 
adjusted 0.241 * 0.237 * 0.225 * 
        
D ROA Target Raw -0.029 0.003    
  
Industry 
adjusted 0.183  0.176  0.208 * 
         
ATpost-leverage  -0.22 * -0.193  -0.23 * 
         
DTAsize  0.043  0.022    
         
Conglomerate  -0.335*** -0.356*** -0.352*** 
         
R-square   27.60% 27.10% 31.80%  
N  50 50 50  
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Figure 1        Diagrammatic representation of a spin-off 
A spin-off occurs when a company distributes the common shares it owns in a 
controlled subsidiary to its existing shareho lders, thereby creating a separate 
public company. At the time of the spin-off, the subsidiary becomes a stand-alone 
public entity that is administratively and financially independent of the parent. In 
effect, the consolidated firm is divided into two (or more) firms with an identical 
set of shareholders. 
 
1. Shareholders (SH) own 100% of the stock of  Parent (P). 
2. P owns 100% of the stock of the Subsidiary (S). 
3. P spins off S and distributes the stock of S to SH.               
    
         Parent 
         Corp. 
    
         Parent 
         Corp. 
    
     Subsidiary 
     Corp. 
    
     Subsidiary 
     Corp. 
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Figure 2         Distribution of risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal monthly bond market 
returns of the outstanding nonconvertible bonds of the parent firms 
around the month of the spin-off announcement.  
Abnormal returns for all the non-convertible bonds of a sample of 37 firms that announced and 
completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP 
tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, publications such as 
Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and Acquisitions, and news wires and articles from Lexis-
Nexis and the Wall Street Journal   for the period 1979 to early 1998. All nonconvertible bonds of 
the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and around the spin-off announcement month 
are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement 
month is identified as “month 0”. A risk-maturity adjusted benchmark index is constructed from 
ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimension of risk and maturity. For each 
bond the return on the risk-maturity benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding 
monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the 
abnormal returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated across all bonds for the same firm  
and then averaged across firms in each event month.
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Figure 3        Distribution of risk-maturity-adjusted abnormal monthly bond 
market returns of the outstanding nonconvertible bonds of the 
acquirer firms around the month of the merger announcement. 
Abnormal returns for all the non-convertible bonds of a sample of acquirer firms that announced 
and completed a merger/acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and matched to the spin-off 
sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm in the spin-off.  Mergers/acquisitions 
are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. All nonconvertible bonds 
of the parent firm that have trader quotes available in and around the merger announcement month 
are identified from the monthly bond price data in the Fixed Income Database (FID). Monthly 
total return is obtained from the Fixed Income Database for each event month. The announcement 
month is identified as “month 0”. A risk-maturity adjusted benchmark index is constructed from 
ten Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes in the dimensions of risk and maturity. For each 
bond the return on the risk- maturity benchmark index is subtracted from the corresponding 
monthly raw return in each event month to calculate the abnormal return. To calculate the 
abnormal returns on a per firm basis, values are first aggregated across all bonds for the same firm 
and then averaged across firms in each event month. 
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Figure 4        Change in firm characteristics of the parent and subsidiary firms. 
 
This figure shows the changes in the parent and subsidiary firms’ characteristics (i.e., Total debt 
and size) from the pre-spin-off year, i.e. in the year prior to the spin-off (t-1)  to the post-spin-off 
year. The spin-off sample consists of 37 parent firms that announced and completed a spin-off 
between 1979 to April 30, 1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data 
Company’s (SDC) Worldwide Acquisition database, publications such as Moody’s Dividend 
Records, Mergers and Acquisitions, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall 
Street Journal   for the period 1979 to early 1998. The final spin-off sample consists of only those 
parent firms that have trader-quotes available in the spin-off announcement month for their 
publicly traded outstanding nonconvertible bonds. Total debt is calculated as the sum of long-term 
debt and current liabilities. Size is measured in terms of the assets of the firm. 
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Figure 5        Change in leverage of the parent and subsidiary firms. 
 
This figure shows the changes in the parent and subsidiary firms’ leverage from the pre-spin-off 
year, i.e. in the year prior to the spin-off (t-1)  to the post-spin-off year. The spin-off sample 
consists of 37 parent firms that announced and completed a spin-off between 1979 to April 30, 
1998. Spin-offs are identified from the CRSP tapes, the Security Data Company’s (SDC) 
Worldwide Acquisition database, publications such as Moody’s Dividend Records, Mergers and 
Acquisitions, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal  for the 
period 1979 to early 1998. The final spin-off sample consists of only those parent firms that have 
trader-quotes available in the spin-off announcement month for their publicly traded outstanding 
nonconvertible bonds. Book leverage is calculated as the ratio of long term debt and current 
liabilities to book value of assets. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt and 
current liabilities to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt. 
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Figure 6        Change in firm characteristics of the acquirer and target firms. 
This figure shows  the changes in the acquirer and target firms’ characteristics (i.e., Total debt and 
size) from the pre-merger/acquisition year, i.e. in the year prior to the merger/acquisition (t-1)  to 
the post-merger/acquisition year. The mergers/acquisition sample includes acquirer firms that 
announced and completed a merger/ acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and are matched 
to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm.  Mergers/acquisitions 
are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. Total debt is calculated 
as the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities. Size is measured in terms of the assets of the 
firm. 
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Figure 7        Change in leverage of the acquirer and target firms. 
This figure shows  the changes in the acquirer and target firms’ characteristics (i.e., Total debt and 
size) from the pre-merger/acquisition year, i.e. in the year prior to the merger/acquisition (t-1)  to 
the post-merger/acquisition year. The mergers/acquisition sample includes acquirer firms that 
announced and completed a merger/ acquisition between 1979 to April 30, 1998 and are matched 
to the spin-off sample by year of announcement and industry of parent firm.  Mergers/acquisitions 
are identified from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisition database. Book leverage is 
calculated as the ratio of long term debt and current liabilities to book value of assets. Market 
leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt and current liabilities to the sum of the market 
value of equity and book value of debt. 
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Appendix 
Skybox International, Litton Industries, Ethyl Corporation, and AT&T are 
examples of spin-offs proposed following the October 1992 spin-off 
announcement by Marriott Corporation affecting the outstanding debtholders of 
the parent firm. 
  
Skybox International, Inc. 
Brooke Group Ltd. completed a spin-off to stockholders of its Skybox 
International subsidiary (a manufacturer and distributor of trading cards and 
related accessories). The stated purpose of the spin-off was to reduce Brooke 
Group's obligations and benefit stockholders. Brooke Group's primary direct 
creditors were the holders of Contingent Value Rights. The creditors had a 
contingent value fixed on November 15, 1993 by reference to Brooke's stock 
price for the period which preceded that date, reduced by the value of any 
dividend paid with respect to that stock. On September 20, 1993, before the 
Skybox spin-off, the aggregate value of these rights was approximately $46.2 
million. Brooke Group fixed the value of these rights at an aggregate of 
approximately $1.1 million. 5 
 
                                                 
5 Maria Mooshil, Brooke Group Rights Holders Cry Foul at 36c-Redemption Price,  Dow Jones 
News, Oct. 15,1993. 
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Litton Industries, Inc. 
In June 1993, Litton Industries, Inc. announced its plan to spin-off by the 
end of June 1993 its growing commercial oil- field information services and 
industrial automation businesses into a new company (Western Atlas, Inc.), with 
Litton to continue as an aerospace/defense company. Litton's shares rose 14% 
following the announcement of the spin-off.6 The spin-off was completed in 
March 1994. To implement the spin-off, Litton called for the redemption of its 
outstanding zero-coupon convertible subordinated notes. Pursuant to the 
conversion terms of the notes, approximately 99.8% of the notes were converted 
into common stock in late July 1993. The remaining notes were redeemed for 
cash. Moody's and Standard & Poor's initially placed approximately $1 billion of 
Litton's debt securities on credit-watch for a possible downgrade because of the 
planned spin-off and ultimately downgraded this debt. A Standard & Poor's 
analyst projected that "the defense business is generating a lot of cash flow, but its 
long-term prospects are weaker." 
 
Ethyl Corporation  
Following Ethyl Corporation's announcement of a contemplated spin-off 
to its shareholders of its Albermarle Corporation’s chemical businesses, Ethyl's 
approximately $400 million of rated debt was placed on credit-watch with 
negative implications as a result of the transaction, reflecting the uneven burden 
                                                 
6 Litton to Separate Commercial Defense Ops in Spin-off, Bloomberg Business news, June 18, 
1993. 
 151 
of the debt to remain on Ethyl and reduced earnings diversity. 7 In January 1994, 
Moody's downgraded Ethyl's senior notes from A3 to Baa3, stating that "the spin-
off action will substantially change the business mix of Ethyl, with negative 
implications for the risk profile of the Company." In March 1994 when the spin-
off was completed, Standard & Poor's and Duff & Phleps followed suit, lowering 
Ethyl's senior debt rating. 
 
AT&T 
In October 2000, AT&T announced its intention to restructure by splitting 
its four businesses including consumer long distance, business services, cable, and  
wireless. The restructuring would entail a complex series of tracking stocks and 
spin-offs. Moody's and Standard & Poor's put AT&T debt on a credit-watch with 
negative implications, meaning the company's ratings could be lowered at any 
time. Standard & Poor's downgraded AT&T's long-term debt. At the time of the 
announcement AT&T had a heavy debt load of $62 billion on its balance sheet. 
The credit agencies were concerned about the capital structures of the newly 
created entities and how AT&T would allocate debt to each unit. Credit ratings 
are important to corporations, especially those with a large amount of debt, 
because they affect a company's ability to tap the public markets to refinance that 
debt. For AT&T, lower ratings could make it more expensive to raise more 
money and could hinder its ability to get financing. AT&T, whose short-term debt 
was about $33 billion at the time of announcement, needed to roll over or 
                                                 
7 S and P Places Ethyl Corp's Debt on Creditwatch; Negative, Bloomberg Business news, Sept. 
17, 1993. 
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refinance some of that debt as often as every 30 to 90 days. But each time the 
rating is lowered, AT&T's debt became less attractive to bondholders and the 
company paid a higher interest rate to holders. Bond market analysts and 
investors anticipated that a fragmented AT&T would not be strong enough to 
support the A1/AA- ratings of the parent for the individual units. Following the 
announcement yield spreads to Treasuries on AT&T's debt issues widened about 
0.40 to 0.50 percentage points and the volatility of AT&T bonds increased. 
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